Policy-enforcing MCP proxy with portable evidence output.
Policy-as-code for MCP agents: enforce what a tool call can do, prove what it did, and stay honest about what you can't. A deterministic, fail-closed policy gate for MCP tool calls, with real kernel-level (eBPF/LSM) enforcement on Linux and offline-verifiable evidence. CI-native, no backend, bounded by design. In 2026 agents got real tool access through MCP, and the attacks came with it: tool…
La vérification confirme l’identité de l’éditeur (la propriété du dépôt), pas la sûreté du code. L’analyse de sécurité couvre les CVE connues et les scripts d’installation suspects.
Forge n’a aucune analyse enregistrée pour cette entrée et n’a donc aucune observation de sa surface d’outils. C’est une absence de preuve, pas la preuve qu’elle n’expose aucun outil.
Policy-as-code for MCP agents: enforce what a tool call can do, prove what it did, and stay honest about what you can't. A deterministic, fail-closed policy gate for MCP tool calls, with real kernel-level (eBPF/LSM) enforcement on Linux and offline-verifiable evidence. CI-native, no backend, bounded by design. In 2026 agents got real tool access through MCP, and the attacks came with it: tool poisoning, rug pulls, confused-deputy OAuth, dozens of CVEs in the first months alone. Most tools scan…