Stop your agent before it runs rm -rf /etc or emails your .env. Deterministic preflight checks.
Déduit des transports déclarés par cette annonce (streamable-http). Un client absent de cette liste n’est pas écarté pour autant — c’est simplement quelque chose que Forge ne peut pas confirmer.
La vérification confirme l’identité de l’éditeur (la propriété du dépôt), pas la sûreté du code. L’analyse de sécurité couvre les CVE connues et les scripts d’installation suspects.
Lu depuis un véritable échange MCP initialize → tools/list contre l’endpoint déclaré. Aucun outil n’a été invoqué — tools/list est l’appel d’introspection en lecture seule que le protocole prévoit pour cela. Cela reflète ce que le serveur annonçait à cet instant ; un endpoint hébergé n’est figé sur aucune version et peut changer sans préavis.
https://agent-utility-mcp.insivotron.workers.dev/mcp4 outils · 228 msanalyze_url_riskAnalyze a URL for structural and security risk signals and return a deterministic, policy-aware decision (allow, notice, confirm or block) under the applicable policy — permissive, balanced or strict, balanced by default.Analyze a URL for structural and security risk signals and return a deterministic, policy-aware decision (allow, notice, confirm or block) under the applicable policy — permissive, balanced or strict, balanced by default.
| Paramètre | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| url* | string | The absolute URL to analyze. |
| policy | string | Optional policy used to compute the decision: permissive, balanced or strict (default: balanced). |
| context | object | Optional declarative context. |
inspect_commandprivilégiéAnalyze a shell command before execution and return a deterministic, policy-aware decision (allow, notice, confirm or block) without running it, under the applicable policy — permissive, balanced or strict, balanced by default. Paths outside a known workspace_root are treated as higher risk than pa…Analyze a shell command before execution and return a deterministic, policy-aware decision (allow, notice, confirm or block) without running it, under the applicable policy — permissive, balanced or strict, balanced by default. Paths outside a known workspace_root are treated as higher risk than pa…
| Paramètre | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| command* | string | The complete command text to inspect without executing it. |
| shell | string | The command shell, when known. |
| cwd | string | Optional working-directory context. It is never accessed. |
| policy | string | Optional policy used to compute the decision: permissive, balanced or strict (default: balanced). |
| context | object | Optional declarative context. |
inspect_fileInspect a Base64-encoded file locally for deterministic structural and security risk signals without executing it, and return a policy-aware decision (allow, notice, confirm or block) under the applicable policy — permissive, balanced or strict, balanced by default.Inspect a Base64-encoded file locally for deterministic structural and security risk signals without executing it, and return a policy-aware decision (allow, notice, confirm or block) under the applicable policy — permissive, balanced or strict, balanced by default.
| Paramètre | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| filename* | string | The original filename, including its extension. |
| content_base64* | string | The complete file content encoded as canonical Base64 (maximum decoded size: 1 MiB). |
| policy | string | Optional policy used to compute the decision: permissive, balanced or strict (default: balanced). |
| context | object | Optional declarative context. |
analyze_tool_callAnalyze a proposed AI-agent tool call before execution and return a deterministic, policy-aware decision (allow, notice, confirm or block) covering destructive actions, sensitive-data exposure, external transmission, privilege changes and irreversible operations, under the applicable policy — permi…Analyze a proposed AI-agent tool call before execution and return a deterministic, policy-aware decision (allow, notice, confirm or block) covering destructive actions, sensitive-data exposure, external transmission, privilege changes and irreversible operations, under the applicable policy — permi…
| Paramètre | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| tool_name* | string | The exact name of the proposed tool. |
| arguments* | — | The proposed tool arguments. They are analyzed as data and never executed. |
| policy | string | Optional policy used to compute the decision: permissive, balanced or strict (default: balanced). |
| context | object | Optional declarative context about the proposed operation. |
4 outils sur 4 ont publié une description.
Les noms et descriptions d’outils sont écrits par l’éditeur et affichés tels quels, comme du texte inerte. Ce sont les chaînes qu’un client MCP transmet à un modèle, alors Forge y recherche des motifs d’injection de prompt — tout constat apparaît avec l’analyse de sécurité ci-dessus. « Privilégié » est une correspondance de mot-clé sur le nom de l’outil, pas un audit de ce qu’il fait : un nom anodin peut tout de même tout faire.
Stop your agent before it runs rm -rf /etc or emails your .env. Deterministic preflight checks.
Les noms cliquables ouvrent l’index Forge de toutes les entrées observées exposant cet outil. Parcourir tous les outils indexés.
Cette entrée ne publie aucun paquet npm : Forge n'a donc pas d'arbre de dépendances pour elle. C'est une lacune de couverture — pas une affirmation qu'elle n'a aucune dépendance.