Pay-per-call safety guards for AI agents: injection, tool-call, signing, secret, x402-trust.
Dedotto dai trasporti dichiarati da questo annuncio (streamable-http). Un client che non compare qui non è escluso — semplicemente Forge non è in grado di confermarlo.
La verifica conferma l’identità del publisher (la proprietà del repo), non la sicurezza del codice. L’analisi di sicurezza copre i CVE noti e gli script di installazione sospetti.
Letto da un vero handshake MCP initialize → tools/list verso l’endpoint dichiarato. Nessuno strumento è stato invocato — tools/list è la chiamata di introspezione in sola lettura che il protocollo prevede a questo scopo. Riflette ciò che il server annunciava in quel momento; un endpoint ospitato non è vincolato ad alcuna versione e può cambiare senza preavviso.
https://paygent.obsmetrics.com/mcp7 strumenti · 1624 mssecure-code-reviewSecurity review of a code snippet or diff. Returns structured findings (severity, CWE, location, remediation). [security; up to 75c/call]Security review of a code snippet or diff. Returns structured findings (severity, CWE, location, remediation). [security; up to 75c/call]
| Parametro | Tipo | Descrizione |
|---|---|---|
| code* | string | Source code or unified diff to review |
| language | string | Language hint, e.g. typescript, python |
| context | string | Optional context about the code |
pr-summaryTurn a git diff into a clear PR description or release notes. [dev-tools; up to 30c/call]Turn a git diff into a clear PR description or release notes. [dev-tools; up to 30c/call]
| Parametro | Tipo | Descrizione |
|---|---|---|
| diff* | string | Unified git diff to summarise |
| style | string | e.g. conventional, changelog, executive |
x402-trust-auditVet an x402 counterparty before settling USDC: scores the advertised payment requirements AND (when supplied) the EIP-3009 authorization you are about to sign. Returns a machine-enforceable trust verdict (per-entry scores, coverage-honest trustScore, spend-constraint + tamper-evident fingerprint) f…Vet an x402 counterparty before settling USDC: scores the advertised payment requirements AND (when supplied) the EIP-3009 authorization you are about to sign. Returns a machine-enforceable trust verdict (per-entry scores, coverage-honest trustScore, spend-constraint + tamper-evident fingerprint) f…
| Parametro | Tipo | Descrizione |
|---|---|---|
| paymentRequirements* | — | The x402 payment requirements from the counterparty: the 402 `accepts` array, or a single object. |
| selectedOptionIndex | number | Index in the accepts array the buyer intends to settle (default 0). The verdict is scoped to it. |
| paymentPayload | — | The UNSIGNED EIP-3009 authorization the buyer is about to sign: { authorization|message: {from,to,value,validAfter,validBefore,nonce}, domain: {name,version,ch… |
| expected | object | Optional caller expectations. |
| spendPolicy | object | Optional buyer spend policy to evaluate against and to pin facilitators. |
| endpointUrl | string | Resource URL being paid (context only; never fetched). |
| serverMetadata | — | Optional server metadata the caller already holds (context only; not fetched). |
| context | string | Optional free-form context. |
sign-guardPre-sign safety oracle for agent wallets: submit the transaction or EIP-712 message you are about to sign and get a machine-enforceable verdict. Decodes the calldata/typed-data, flags the drainer toolkit (unlimited approvals, setApprovalForAll, permit/permit2 + EIP-3009 to an unexpected party, tran…Pre-sign safety oracle for agent wallets: submit the transaction or EIP-712 message you are about to sign and get a machine-enforceable verdict. Decodes the calldata/typed-data, flags the drainer toolkit (unlimited approvals, setApprovalForAll, permit/permit2 + EIP-3009 to an unexpected party, tran…
| Parametro | Tipo | Descrizione |
|---|---|---|
| tx | object | An EVM transaction you are about to sign. |
| typedData | object | An EIP-712 message you are about to sign (the off-chain drainer surface: permit, Permit2, EIP-3009). { domain, types, primaryType, message }. |
| expected | object | Your stated intent. Supplying it lets the verdict BIND the action; only a fully bound, clean action is auto-sign-safe. For an allowance, you MUST supply maxAmo… |
| spendPolicy | object | Optional buyer spend policy (context only). |
| context | string | Optional free-form context. |
inject-guardUntrusted-content guardrail for agents: submit a blob of text you are about to feed to your own LLM (scraped web content, a tool result, another agent's message) and get a machine-enforceable verdict - is this a prompt-injection / jailbreak / data-exfiltration / tool-hijack attempt? Returns a risk…Untrusted-content guardrail for agents: submit a blob of text you are about to feed to your own LLM (scraped web content, a tool result, another agent's message) and get a machine-enforceable verdict - is this a prompt-injection / jailbreak / data-exfiltration / tool-hijack attempt? Returns a risk…
| Parametro | Tipo | Descrizione |
|---|---|---|
| content* | string | The untrusted text to scan before you feed it to your LLM. |
| context | string | Optional: where the content came from (url, tool name, sender) - context only. |
tool-call-guardPre-execution safety oracle for agent actions: submit the tool call you are about to run (shell, http, sql, file, code, env) plus your stated intent, and get a machine-enforceable verdict before you execute it. Decodes what the call does, flags the danger toolkit (rm -rf, reverse shell, curl|sh, SS…Pre-execution safety oracle for agent actions: submit the tool call you are about to run (shell, http, sql, file, code, env) plus your stated intent, and get a machine-enforceable verdict before you execute it. Decodes what the call does, flags the danger toolkit (rm -rf, reverse shell, curl|sh, SS…
| Parametro | Tipo | Descrizione |
|---|---|---|
| call* | object | The tool call you are about to execute. |
| intent | string | What this call is for (natural language). Used by the classifier for intent-mismatch. |
| expected | object | Machine-checkable constraints. Supplying them lets the verdict BIND the call; only a positively-scoped, satisfied call is auto-exec-safe. |
| context | string | Optional: where the task/input came from (untrusted source label). |
secret-scanLeaked-credential guardrail for agents: submit a blob you are about to commit, log, post, or hand to another tool (a diff, a config, an .env, an LLM output) and get a machine-enforceable verdict - does it contain a live secret? Detects cloud keys (AWS), VCS tokens (GitHub/GitLab), provider API keys…Leaked-credential guardrail for agents: submit a blob you are about to commit, log, post, or hand to another tool (a diff, a config, an .env, an LLM output) and get a machine-enforceable verdict - does it contain a live secret? Detects cloud keys (AWS), VCS tokens (GitHub/GitLab), provider API keys…
| Parametro | Tipo | Descrizione |
|---|---|---|
| content* | string | The text to scan for leaked secrets (diff, config, .env, log line, LLM output). |
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I nomi e le descrizioni degli strumenti sono scritti dal publisher e mostrati alla lettera come testo inerte. Sono le stringhe che un client MCP passa a un modello, quindi Forge vi cerca schemi di prompt injection — ogni rilievo compare insieme all’analisi di sicurezza qui sopra. «Privilegiato» è una corrispondenza di parola chiave sul nome dello strumento, non una verifica di ciò che fa: un nome innocuo può comunque fare qualsiasi cosa.
Pay-per-call safety guards for AI agents: injection, tool-call, signing, secret, x402-trust.
I nomi collegati aprono l’indice Forge di tutte le voci osservate esporre quello strumento. Sfoglia tutti gli strumenti indicizzati.
Questa voce non pubblica alcun pacchetto npm, quindi Forge non ha un albero delle dipendenze per essa. È una lacuna di copertura, non l'affermazione che non abbia dipendenze.