# @1claw/mcp

HSM-backed vault secrets for AI agents (JIT fetch) plus prompt-injection and threat scanning.

- **Type:** MCP server
- **Trust:** 60/100 (B), scored on the package rubric
- **Verification:** community-indexed — nobody has claimed this listing
- **Version:** 0.56.3
- **Author:** io.github.1clawAI
- **License:** MIT
- **npm:** @1claw/mcp
- **Source:** https://github.com/1clawAI/1claw-mcp
- **Compatible clients:** claude-code, cursor, copilot, gemini (basis: transport)

## Trust

60/100 (B), scored on the package rubric
- Publisher verified: no
- Install scripts: nothing suspicious found
- Prompt-injection scan: not run
- Obfuscation scan: not run
- Evidence age: 43 days

## Security scan

- **Status:** clean
- **Scanned:** 2026-07-16T08:07:45.071Z
- **Version scanned:** 0.41.3
- **CVEs:** none found by OSV at scan time

## Tools

40 declared. Statically extracted from the shipped source — a floor on the surface, not a census.
- `create_binding`
- `create_vault`
- `delete_secret`
- `describe_secret`
- `execute_http`
- `execute_intent`
- `get_approval`
- `get_secret`
- `get_signing_key_balance`
- `get_transaction`
- `grant_access`
- `list_secrets`
- `rotate_and_store`
- `rotate_generate`
- `list_versions`
- `get_env_bundle`
- `inspect_content`
- `lease_bankr_key`
- `list_approvals`
- `list_bindings`
- `list_cards`
- `get_card_status`
- `search_gift_cards`
- `list_executions`
- `list_signing_keys`
- `list_transactions`
- `list_vaults`
- `order_card`
- `order_gift_card`
- `platform_bootstrap_user`
- `platform_create_app`
- `platform_list_apps`
- `platform_reissue_claim`
- `platform_rotate_key`
- `provision_signing_key`
- `proxy_request`
- `put_secret`
- `request_approval`
- `share_secret`
- `sign_digest`

## Install

**Verdict: review** — Installable, but 1 thing to check first: No publisher has proved control of this listing; it is indexed, not vouched for.
**Cautions** (coverage gaps and advisories — never blocking)
- No publisher has proved control of this listing; it is indexed, not vouched for.
**Config** (claude-code):
```json
"{\n  \"mcpServers\": {\n    \"mcp\": {\n      \"command\": \"npx\",\n      \"args\": [\n        \"-y\",\n        \"@1claw/mcp\"\n      ],\n      \"env\": {\n        \"ONECLAW_AGENT_API_KEY\": \"<YOUR_ONECLAW_AGENT_API_KEY>\"\n      }\n    }\n  }\n}"
```
**Credentials it will ask for** (names only — Forge never holds a value):
- `ONECLAW_AGENT_API_KEY` — Oneclaw Agent API Key (optional)
Placeholders only. Forge never holds, brokers, or transmits a credential value — replace each <YOUR_NAME> in your own config file. Do not send a value back to Forge; no Forge endpoint accepts one.
- This entry needs 1 credential (0 required). The generated config carries placeholders, so it will fail in the editor rather than at runtime if they are left unset.

## Blast radius

Extensive blast radius — deletes data; holds an api key.
- Floor 55, ceiling 55 (tier: extensive)
- This is impact, not likelihood. A high radius is not a defect: a filesystem server is supposed to write files. It is never part of the trust score.

## Machine-readable views of this entry

- Signed JSON: https://forgeregistry.com/api/v1/packages/%401claw%2Fmcp
- Install plan: https://forgeregistry.com/api/v1/packages/%401claw%2Fmcp/install-plan
- Alternatives: https://forgeregistry.com/api/v1/alternatives/%401claw%2Fmcp
- HTML page: https://forgeregistry.com/registry/%401claw%2Fmcp
- MCP: POST https://forgeregistry.com/api/mcp → `forge_get_package` / `forge_install_plan`

## About this document

Generated by Forge (https://forgeregistry.com) — a compact rendering of the same record served, signed, at the JSON URL above. Trust and scan facts are the registry's own measurements; anything Forge did not measure is named as unmeasured rather than omitted.