Inspect PDF, Office, and iWork documents without rendering: counts, metadata, security signals
Inferred from the transports this listing declares (stdio). A client not listed here hasn’t been ruled out — it just isn’t something Forge can confirm.
Verification confirms publisher identity (repo ownership), not code safety. The security scan covers known CVEs and suspicious install scripts.
Read out of the source npm actually ships, at scan time. The package was never executed. Tools registered dynamically at runtime, or hidden inside bundled or minified code, can be missed — so this is a floor on the tool surface, not a complete census of it.
list_formatsList the document formats DeckProbe can inspect: drivers, the extensions each oneList the document formats DeckProbe can inspect: drivers, the extensions each one
No input schema was published for this tool.
list_targetsList every target a format supports, with its aliases, value type, minimum probeList every target a format supports, with its aliases, value type, minimum probe
No input schema was published for this tool.
probe_batchNo description publishedThis tool published no description. Forge does not invent one.
probeNo description publishedThis tool published no description. Forge does not invent one.
2 of 4 tools published a description.
Tool names and descriptions are written by the publisher and shown verbatim as inert text. They are the strings an MCP client passes to a model, so Forge scans them for prompt-injection patterns — any finding appears with the security scan above. “Privileged” is a keyword match on the tool name, not an audit of what the tool does: a benign-sounding name can still do anything.
Inspect PDF, Office, and iWork documents without rendering: counts, metadata, security signals
Linked names open Forge’s index of every entry observed exposing that tool. Browse all indexed tools.
Not followed: optionalDependencies. This tree covers runtime dependencies only, so anything those pull in was never resolved.