@didwork/mcp

MCPcommunity
v0.1.1sh.didworkApache-2.0Updated todaynpmGitHub

Verify that an agent's claimed outcome actually happened, using independently gathered evidence

Works in
ClaudeCursorCopilotGemini

Inferred from the transports this listing declares (stdio). A client not listed here hasn’t been ruled out — it just isn’t something Forge can confirm.

Automatically indexed from public sources. Not yet verified by the developer on Forge.Claim this listing →
660Downloads/wk
1GitHub stars
todayLast update
Reads these credentials
  • DIDWORK_API_KEYAPI keyoptional

    DidWork API key, free at https://didwork.sh/console. Optional: the server falls back to the ~/.didwork/api_key file (or DIDWORK_API_KEY_FILE); with no key at all it runs keyless and only http.ok…

Declared by the author in the official MCP registry. Forge does not store, broker, or ever see these values — the config below is scaffolded with placeholders you fill in locally.

Package
Authorsh.didwork
LicenseApache-2.0
Version0.1.1
Sourcenpm+mcp-registry
Trust Status
B
60/100Good
Listed in Forge index+10/10
Publisher identity verified+0/20
Publisher: run `forge publish` from the package repo to claim ownership
Ed25519 publish signature+0/5
Included automatically when the publisher runs `forge publish`
Domain verification+0/5
Publisher: host /.well-known/forge.json on the package homepage with { "publisher": "<github-login>" }
npm Trusted Publishing (Sigstore)+0/5
Publish from GitHub Actions with --provenance so the attestation binds this package to this repo
npm maintainer match+0/5
Earned once your identity is verified above and that login is an npm maintainer of this package
CVE scan · clean+30/30
Static analysis · clean+20/20
Paste into Claude Code, Cursor, or any AI assistant to fix all gaps
StatusCommunity-indexed
PublisherUnverified
SignatureUnsigned
Domain
Provenance
Dependencies✓ 60 resolved+ · none vulnerable
Tool surface8 tools · none privileged
Security scan✓ Cleanv0.0.10 · 16d agoHow well does this scan work?
EvalsNone
IndexedAug 30, 2026

Verification confirms publisher identity (repo ownership), not code safety. The security scan covers known CVEs and suspicious install scripts.

Tools

8 tools · none privileged
Statically extracted from the published packagev0.0.10 · 16d ago

Read out of the source npm actually ships, at scan time. The package was never executed. Tools registered dynamically at runtime, or hidden inside bundled or minified code, can be missed — so this is a floor on the tool surface, not a complete census of it.

did_verifyIndependently verify that an intended outcome is actually true. Send a claim

Independently verify that an intended outcome is actually true. Send a claim

No input schema was published for this tool.

did_getFetch a verification by id (poll a pending async verification).

Fetch a verification by id (poll a pending async verification).

No input schema was published for this tool.

did_listRecent verifications for this API key — the developer log, evidence included.

Recent verifications for this API key — the developer log, evidence included.

No input schema was published for this tool.

did_watchContinuously re-verify a claim on an interval (e.g. '10m', '1h').

Continuously re-verify a claim on an interval (e.g. '10m', '1h').

No input schema was published for this tool.

did_watchesList active watches with their last verdicts.

List active watches with their last verdicts.

No input schema was published for this tool.

did_unwatchStop a watch by id.

Stop a watch by id.

No input schema was published for this tool.

did_usageVerifications performed, by month.

Verifications performed, by month.

No input schema was published for this tool.

did_inspect_toolCapability Trust: before calling an agent tool with real-world consequences (money,

Capability Trust: before calling an agent tool with real-world consequences (money,

No input schema was published for this tool.

8 of 8 tools published a description.

Tool names and descriptions are written by the publisher and shown verbatim as inert text. They are the strings an MCP client passes to a model, so Forge scans them for prompt-injection patterns — any finding appears with the security scan above. “Privileged” is a keyword match on the tool name, not an audit of what the tool does: a benign-sounding name can still do anything.

About

Verify that an agent's claimed outcome actually happened, using independently gathered evidence

Keywords
mcp
Alternatives
Comparing tool surfaces…

Dependency tree

What one Forge scan resolved from npm metadata on 2026-09-08 — observed resolution, not a publisher declaration.

60 packages resolved · 3 direct · none carrying advisories Resolution stops at depth 4 and 60 packages.

The crawl stopped at the depth-4 limit. Anything below that level was never resolved.

The crawl stopped at the 60-package limit. The rest of the tree was never resolved.

36 more resolved packages are not drawn here (display cap: 24). Every dependency carrying an advisory is drawn regardless of the cap. Full inventory (CycloneDX SBOM)

Declared but not resolved

55 declared dependencies never landed in the tree. They are missing from Forge's resolution, not from the package.

+43 more not listed. The counts by reason above cover all of them.

Not followed: peerDependencies. This tree covers runtime dependencies only, so anything those pull in was never resolved.