Observation-only CI/CD validation for AI coding agents.
Inferred from the transports this listing declares (stdio). A client not listed here hasn’t been ruled out — it just isn’t something Forge can confirm.
Verification confirms publisher identity (repo ownership), not code safety. The security scan covers known CVEs and suspicious install scripts.
Read out of the source npm actually ships, at scan time. The package was never executed. Tools registered dynamically at runtime, or hidden inside bundled or minified code, can be missed — so this is a floor on the tool surface, not a complete census of it.
diffci_checkAnalyze the repository, run inferred full and selected test commands when available, and report paired runtime. Sends nothing to DiffCI Cloud.Analyze the repository, run inferred full and selected test commands when available, and report paired runtime. Sends nothing to DiffCI Cloud.
No input schema was published for this tool.
diffci_initSeed a repository with AI-agent instruction files for DiffCI.Seed a repository with AI-agent instruction files for DiffCI.
No input schema was published for this tool.
diffci_verify_workflowCheck that a DiffCI GitHub Actions job cannot affect the rest of CI.Check that a DiffCI GitHub Actions job cannot affect the rest of CI.
No input schema was published for this tool.
3 of 3 tools published a description.
Tool names and descriptions are written by the publisher and shown verbatim as inert text. They are the strings an MCP client passes to a model, so Forge scans them for prompt-injection patterns — any finding appears with the security scan above. “Privileged” is a keyword match on the tool name, not an audit of what the tool does: a benign-sounding name can still do anything.
Observation-only CI/CD validation for AI coding agents.
Linked names open Forge’s index of every entry observed exposing that tool. Browse all indexed tools.
1 declared dependencies never landed in the tree. They are missing from Forge's resolution, not from the package.