@getmcpm/cli

MCPattested
v0.43.0io.github.getmcpmMITUpdated 3d agonpmGitHub

MCP security guard and package manager: block prompt injection, tool poisoning and rug-pulls in Model Context Protocol servers at runtime; trust-scored installs for Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor, VS Code, Windsurf, Gemini CLI.

Works in
ClaudeCursorCopilotGemini

Inferred from the transports this listing declares (stdio). A client not listed here hasn’t been ruled out — it just isn’t something Forge can confirm.

Attested build
A verified provenance attestation binds this artifact to the listed repository. Nobody has claimed the listing yet — this proves where the code was built, not who stands behind it.
1kDownloads/wk
3GitHub stars
1Forks
3d agoLast update
Package
Authorio.github.getmcpm
LicenseMIT
Version0.43.0
Sourcenpm+mcp-registry
Trust Status
A
85/100Trusted
✓Listed in Forge index+10/10
✓Identity verified · attested build+20/20
—Ed25519 publish signature+0/5
→ Included automatically when the publisher runs `forge publish`
—Domain verification+0/5
→ Publisher: host /.well-known/forge.json on the package homepage with { "publisher": "<github-login>" }
✓npm Trusted Publishing (Sigstore)+5/5
—npm maintainer match+0/5
→ Publisher: add the verified GitHub login to the npm package's maintainers (npm owner add <login>)
✓CVE scan · clean+30/30
✓Static analysis · clean+20/20
Paste into Claude Code, Cursor, or any AI assistant to fix all gaps
StatusIdentity verified
PublisherUnverified
SignatureUnsigned
Domain—
Provenance✓ Sigstore-verified · 49ba77f
Dependencies✓ 60 resolved+ · none vulnerable
Tool surface10 tools · 2 privileged
Security scan✓ Cleanv0.31.0 · 1mo agoHow well does this scan work?
EvalsNone
IndexedAug 18, 2026

Verification confirms publisher identity (repo ownership), not code safety. The security scan covers known CVEs and suspicious install scripts.

Tools

10 tools · 2 privileged
Statically extracted from the published packagev0.31.0 · 1mo ago

Read out of the source npm actually ships, at scan time. The package was never executed. Tools registered dynamically at runtime, or hidden inside bundled or minified code, can be missed — so this is a floor on the tool surface, not a complete census of it.

read_threadRead the contents of a chat thread.

Read the contents of a chat thread.

No input schema was published for this tool.

mcpm_searchSearch the MCP registry for servers with trust scores

Search the MCP registry for servers with trust scores

No input schema was published for this tool.

mcpm_installprivilegedInstall an MCP server with trust assessment

Install an MCP server with trust assessment

No input schema was published for this tool.

mcpm_infoShow full details and trust score for an MCP server

Show full details and trust score for an MCP server

No input schema was published for this tool.

mcpm_listList installed MCP servers across AI clients

List installed MCP servers across AI clients

No input schema was published for this tool.

mcpm_removeprivilegedRemove an MCP server from client configs

Remove an MCP server from client configs

No input schema was published for this tool.

mcpm_auditScan all installed servers and produce trust report

Scan all installed servers and produce trust report

No input schema was published for this tool.

mcpm_doctorCheck MCP setup health

Check MCP setup health

No input schema was published for this tool.

mcpm_setupInstall MCP servers from a natural language description

Install MCP servers from a natural language description

No input schema was published for this tool.

mcpm_upInstall all servers from an mcpm.yaml stack file with trust verification. Equivalent to docker-compose up for MCP servers. Runs trust re-assessment and blocks servers that violate the trust policy. Pass profile to install only servers matching that profile, or dryRun to preview what would be instal…

Install all servers from an mcpm.yaml stack file with trust verification. Equivalent to docker-compose up for MCP servers. Runs trust re-assessment and blocks servers that violate the trust policy. Pass profile to install only servers matching that profile, or dryRun to preview what would be instal…

No input schema was published for this tool.

10 of 10 tools published a description.

Tool names and descriptions are written by the publisher and shown verbatim as inert text. They are the strings an MCP client passes to a model, so Forge scans them for prompt-injection patterns — any finding appears with the security scan above. “Privileged” is a keyword match on the tool name, not an audit of what the tool does: a benign-sounding name can still do anything.

About

MCP security guard and package manager: block prompt injection, tool poisoning and rug-pulls in Model Context Protocol servers at runtime; trust-scored installs for Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor, VS Code, Windsurf, Gemini CLI.

Keywords
mcpmodel-context-protocolmcp-securitymcp-serverpackage-managerclisecurityprompt-injectiontool-poisoningllm-securityai-agentssupply-chain-securitysigstoreclaudeclaude-codecursorvscodewindsurfgemini-cli
Alternatives
Comparing tool surfaces…

Dependency tree

What one Forge scan resolved from npm metadata on 2026-08-30 — observed resolution, not a publisher declaration.

60 packages resolved · 14 direct · none carrying advisories Resolution stops at depth 4 and 60 packages.

The crawl stopped at the 60-package limit. The rest of the tree was never resolved.

36 more resolved packages are not drawn here (display cap: 24). Every dependency carrying an advisory is drawn regardless of the cap. Full inventory (CycloneDX SBOM)

Declared but not resolved

77 declared dependencies never landed in the tree. They are missing from Forge's resolution, not from the package.

+65 more not listed. The counts by reason above cover all of them.

Not followed: optionalDependencies, peerDependencies. This tree covers runtime dependencies only, so anything those pull in was never resolved.

Topics

Related in security