@grantor/mcp

MCPcommunity
v0.2.0UnknownSEE LICENSE IN LICENSEUpdated 1mo agonpm

Grantor permission broker for multi-agent frameworks — grant, delegate, check, revoke bounded capabilities over MCP, and wrap any stdio MCP server with enforced permissions. No authorization server anywhere.

Works in
ClaudeCursorCopilotGemini

Inferred from the transports this listing declares (stdio). A client not listed here hasn’t been ruled out — it just isn’t something Forge can confirm.

Automatically indexed from public sources. Not yet verified by the developer on Forge.Claim this listing →
870Downloads/wk
1mo agoLast update
Package
AuthorUnknown
LicenseSEE LICENSE IN LICENSE
Version0.2.0
Sourcenpm+mcp-registry
Trust Status
B
60/100Good
✓Listed in Forge index+10/10
—Publisher identity verified+0/20
→ Publisher: run `forge publish` from the package repo to claim ownership
—Ed25519 publish signature+0/5
→ Included automatically when the publisher runs `forge publish`
—Domain verification+0/5
→ Publisher: host /.well-known/forge.json on the package homepage with { "publisher": "<github-login>" }
—npm Trusted Publishing (Sigstore)+0/5
→ Publish from GitHub Actions with --provenance so the attestation binds this package to this repo
—npm maintainer match+0/5
→ Earned once your identity is verified above and that login is an npm maintainer of this package
✓CVE scan · clean+30/30
✓Static analysis · clean+20/20
Paste into Claude Code, Cursor, or any AI assistant to fix all gaps
StatusCommunity-indexed
PublisherUnverified
SignatureUnsigned
Domain—
Provenance—
Dependencies✓ 60 resolved+ · none vulnerable
Tool surface7 tools · 1 privileged
Security scan✓ Cleanv0.1.8 · 1mo agoHow well does this scan work?
EvalsNone
IndexedAug 25, 2026

Verification confirms publisher identity (repo ownership), not code safety. The security scan covers known CVEs and suspicious install scripts.

Tools

7 tools · 1 privileged
Statically extracted from the published packagev0.1.8 · 1mo ago

Read out of the source npm actually ships, at scan time. The package was never executed. Tools registered dynamically at runtime, or hidden inside bundled or minified code, can be missed — so this is a floor on the tool surface, not a complete census of it.

grantGive a sub-agent a BOUNDED capability: named tools only, a use budget, an expiry. Returns a child_id the broker holds. This is what to use instead of handing a sub-agent your credentials.

Give a sub-agent a BOUNDED capability: named tools only, a use budget, an expiry. Returns a child_id the broker holds. This is what to use instead of handing a sub-agent your credentials.

No input schema was published for this tool.

delegateNarrow an existing child's capability onward to a new child (fewer tools, fewer uses, shorter expiry). Widening is refused at signing AND cryptographically at verify.

Narrow an existing child's capability onward to a new child (fewer tools, fewer uses, shorter expiry). Widening is refused at signing AND cryptographically at verify.

No input schema was published for this tool.

checkAuthorize ONE action for a child: real on-chain verification (root key, revocation epoch, tenant billing) + capability match + local use budget. Returns {allow:true, remaining_uses} or {allow:false, code, reason}. Gate every sub-agent action on this.

Authorize ONE action for a child: real on-chain verification (root key, revocation epoch, tenant billing) + capability match + local use budget. Returns {allow:true, remaining_uses} or {allow:false, code, reason}. Gate every sub-agent action on this.

No input schema was published for this tool.

revokeRevoke a child's authority. With your own tenant + admin key this is a real on-chain bumpEpoch; in the sandbox it revokes at the broker (which holds the key and is the check-point).

Revoke a child's authority. With your own tenant + admin key this is a real on-chain bumpEpoch; in the sandbox it revokes at the broker (which holds the key and is the check-point).

No input schema was published for this tool.

statusBroker + tenant status: mode, live on-chain tenant standing, principal registration, child/use counters.

Broker + tenant status: mode, live on-chain tenant standing, principal registration, child/use counters.

No input schema was published for this tool.

searchSearch the toy corpus (harmless).

Search the toy corpus (harmless).

No input schema was published for this tool.

delete_everythingprivilegedDelete all the things (toy — deletes nothing, anywhere).

Delete all the things (toy — deletes nothing, anywhere).

No input schema was published for this tool.

7 of 7 tools published a description.

Tool names and descriptions are written by the publisher and shown verbatim as inert text. They are the strings an MCP client passes to a model, so Forge scans them for prompt-injection patterns — any finding appears with the security scan above. “Privileged” is a keyword match on the tool name, not an audit of what the tool does: a benign-sounding name can still do anything.

About

Grantor permission broker for multi-agent frameworks — grant, delegate, check, revoke bounded capabilities over MCP, and wrap any stdio MCP server with enforced permissions. No authorization server anywhere.

Keywords
mcpmodel-context-protocolagentsai-agentsauthorizationcapabilitiesdelegationleast-privilegeproxyenforcementsecurityaccess-controlmulti-agentrevocationweb3
Alternatives
Comparing tool surfaces…

Dependency tree

What one Forge scan resolved from npm metadata on 2026-08-29 — observed resolution, not a publisher declaration.

60 packages resolved · 5 direct · none carrying advisories Resolution stops at depth 4 and 60 packages.

The crawl stopped at the 60-package limit. The rest of the tree was never resolved.

36 more resolved packages are not drawn here (display cap: 24). Every dependency carrying an advisory is drawn regardless of the cap. Full inventory (CycloneDX SBOM)

Declared but not resolved

58 declared dependencies never landed in the tree. They are missing from Forge's resolution, not from the package.

+46 more not listed. The counts by reason above cover all of them.

Not followed: peerDependencies. This tree covers runtime dependencies only, so anything those pull in was never resolved.

Topics

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