Catches leaked credentials and PII in outbound LLM prompts
Inferred from the transports this listing declares (stdio). A client not listed here hasn’t been ruled out — it just isn’t something Forge can confirm.
Verification confirms publisher identity (repo ownership), not code safety. The security scan covers known CVEs and suspicious install scripts.
Read out of the source npm actually ships, at scan time. The package was never executed. Tools registered dynamically at runtime, or hidden inside bundled or minified code, can be missed — so this is a floor on the tool surface, not a complete census of it.
scan_textinjection riskScan a raw text string (e.g. a prompt you're about to send to an LLM) for leaked credentials (API keys, private keys, JWTs) and PII (TC Kimlik No, credit card, IBAN, email, phone) — checksum-validated where applicable to keep false positives low.Scan a raw text string (e.g. a prompt you're about to send to an LLM) for leaked credentials (API keys, private keys, JWTs) and PII (TC Kimlik No, credit card, IBAN, email, phone) — checksum-validated where applicable to keep false positives low.
e.g. a prompt you're about to send to an LLM) for leaked credentials (API keys, private keys, JWTs) and PII (TC Kimlik N…No input schema was published for this tool.
scan_messagesScan an OpenAI/Anthropic-style chat request body (a JSON object with a `messages` array and/or a `system` field) for leaked credentials and PII in every message's text content, before it would be sent to the model.Scan an OpenAI/Anthropic-style chat request body (a JSON object with a `messages` array and/or a `system` field) for leaked credentials and PII in every message's text content, before it would be sent to the model.
No input schema was published for this tool.
scan_fileScan a single file — plain text, or a JSON chat-request-body fixture (auto-detected) — for leaked credentials and PIIScan a single file — plain text, or a JSON chat-request-body fixture (auto-detected) — for leaked credentials and PII
No input schema was published for this tool.
scan_directoryRecursively scan a directory of prompt logs or request-body fixtures for leaked credentials and PIIRecursively scan a directory of prompt logs or request-body fixtures for leaked credentials and PII
No input schema was published for this tool.
list_patternsList every credential/PII pattern this scanner detects, grouped by categoryList every credential/PII pattern this scanner detects, grouped by category
No input schema was published for this tool.
5 of 5 tools published a description.
Tool names and descriptions are written by the publisher and shown verbatim as inert text. They are the strings an MCP client passes to a model, so Forge scans them for prompt-injection patterns — any finding appears with the security scan above. “Privileged” is a keyword match on the tool name, not an audit of what the tool does: a benign-sounding name can still do anything.
Catches leaked credentials and PII in outbound LLM prompts
Linked names open Forge’s index of every entry observed exposing that tool. Browse all indexed tools.
The crawl stopped at the 60-package limit. The rest of the tree was never resolved.
36 more resolved packages are not drawn here (display cap: 24). Every dependency carrying an advisory is drawn regardless of the cap. Full inventory (CycloneDX SBOM)
56 declared dependencies never landed in the tree. They are missing from Forge's resolution, not from the package.
+44 more not listed. The counts by reason above cover all of them.
Not followed: peerDependencies. This tree covers runtime dependencies only, so anything those pull in was never resolved.