@guardbee/mcp-server-auditor

MCPattested
v0.1.8io.github.GuardBeeMITUpdated 1d agonpmGitHub

Scans MCP server tool definitions for excessive agency, injection sinks, hardcoded secrets

Works in
ClaudeCursorCopilotGemini

Inferred from the transports this listing declares (stdio). A client not listed here hasn’t been ruled out — it just isn’t something Forge can confirm.

Attested build
A verified provenance attestation binds this artifact to the listed repository. Nobody has claimed the listing yet — this proves where the code was built, not who stands behind it.
73Downloads/wk
1GitHub stars
1Forks
1d agoLast update
Package
Authorio.github.GuardBee
LicenseMIT
Version0.1.8
Sourcenpm+mcp-registry
npm@guardbee/mcp-server-auditor
GitHubGuardBee/guardbee-mcp
SBOMCycloneDX 1.6 ↓
Trust Status
A
85/100Trusted
✓Listed in Forge index+10/10
✓Identity verified · attested build+20/20
—Ed25519 publish signature+0/5
→ Included automatically when the publisher runs `forge publish`
—Domain verification+0/5
→ Publisher: host /.well-known/forge.json on the package homepage with { "publisher": "<github-login>" }
✓npm Trusted Publishing (Sigstore)+5/5
—npm maintainer match+0/5
→ Publisher: add the verified GitHub login to the npm package's maintainers (npm owner add <login>)
✓CVE scan · clean+30/30
✓Static analysis · clean+20/20
Paste into Claude Code, Cursor, or any AI assistant to fix all gaps
StatusIdentity verified
PublisherUnverified
SignatureUnsigned
Domain—
Provenance✓ Sigstore-verified · 392a5a9
Dependencies✓ 60 resolved+ · none vulnerable
Tool surface8 tools · 2 privileged
Security scan✓ Cleanv0.1.8 · todayHow well does this scan work?
EvalsNone
IndexedOct 9, 2026

Verification confirms publisher identity (repo ownership), not code safety. The security scan covers known CVEs and suspicious install scripts.

Tools

8 tools · 2 privileged
Statically extracted from the published packagev0.1.8 · 15h ago

Read out of the source npm actually ships, at scan time. The package was never executed. Tools registered dynamically at runtime, or hidden inside bundled or minified code, can be missed — so this is a floor on the tool surface, not a complete census of it.

run_shellprivilegedruns a shell command

runs a shell command

No input schema was published for this tool.

execute_sqlprivilegedNo description published

This tool published no description. Forge does not invent one.

query_tablequeries a table

queries a table

No input schema was published for this tool.

update_rowdesc

desc

No input schema was published for this tool.

scan_textScan a text string or code snippet for insecure MCP server/tool-definition patterns (excessive-agency tool names, shell/eval/SQL/SSRF sinks fed by raw tool input, overly permissive schemas, hardcoded secrets, wildcard CORS).

Scan a text string or code snippet for insecure MCP server/tool-definition patterns (excessive-agency tool names, shell/eval/SQL/SSRF sinks fed by raw tool input, overly permissive schemas, hardcoded secrets, wildcard CORS).

No input schema was published for this tool.

scan_fileScan a single file for insecure MCP server/tool-definition patterns

Scan a single file for insecure MCP server/tool-definition patterns

No input schema was published for this tool.

scan_directoryRecursively scan an MCP server's codebase for insecure tool-definition patterns. Automatically skips node_modules, .git, dist, and binary files.

Recursively scan an MCP server's codebase for insecure tool-definition patterns. Automatically skips node_modules, .git, dist, and binary files.

No input schema was published for this tool.

list_patternsList all MCP server security patterns that the auditor can detect, grouped by category

List all MCP server security patterns that the auditor can detect, grouped by category

No input schema was published for this tool.

7 of 8 tools published a description.

Tool names and descriptions are written by the publisher and shown verbatim as inert text. They are the strings an MCP client passes to a model, so Forge scans them for prompt-injection patterns — any finding appears with the security scan above. “Privileged” is a keyword match on the tool name, not an audit of what the tool does: a benign-sounding name can still do anything.

About

Scans MCP server tool definitions for excessive agency, injection sinks, hardcoded secrets

Keywords
mcp
Alternatives
Comparing tool surfaces…

Tools exposed

8 tools · 2 privileged · observed by static extraction. A tool surface is what one scan read on one day, not a live capability list.

Linked names open Forge’s index of every entry observed exposing that tool. Browse all indexed tools.

Dependency tree

What one Forge scan resolved from npm metadata on 2026-10-10 — observed resolution, not a publisher declaration.

60 packages resolved · 3 direct · none carrying advisories Resolution stops at depth 4 and 60 packages.

The crawl stopped at the depth-4 limit. Anything below that level was never resolved.

The crawl stopped at the 60-package limit. The rest of the tree was never resolved.

36 more resolved packages are not drawn here (display cap: 24). Every dependency carrying an advisory is drawn regardless of the cap. Full inventory (CycloneDX SBOM)

Declared but not resolved

55 declared dependencies never landed in the tree. They are missing from Forge's resolution, not from the package.

+43 more not listed. The counts by reason above cover all of them.

Not followed: peerDependencies. This tree covers runtime dependencies only, so anything those pull in was never resolved.