@guardbee/mcp-toxic-flow-auditor

MCPattested

v0.1.14io.github.GuardBeeMITUpdated todaynpm GitHub

Finds lethal-trifecta toxic flows in MCP tool catalogs: untrusted input, sensitive data, egress

Works in

ClaudeCursorCopilotGemini

Inferred from the transports this listing declares (stdio). A client not listed here hasn’t been ruled out — it just isn’t something Forge can confirm.

Attested build

A verified provenance attestation binds this artifact to the listed repository. Nobody has claimed the listing yet — this proves where the code was built, not who stands behind it.

530Downloads/wk

1GitHub stars

1Forks

todayLast update

Package

Authorio.github.GuardBee

LicenseMIT

Version0.1.14

Sourcenpm+mcp-registry

npm@guardbee/mcp-toxic-flow-auditor

GitHubGuardBee/guardbee-mcp

SBOMCycloneDX 1.6 ↓

Trust Status

A

85/100Trusted

✓Listed in Forge index+10/10

✓Identity verified · attested build+20/20

—Ed25519 publish signature+0/5

→ Included automatically when the publisher runs `forge publish`

—Domain verification+0/5

→ Publisher: host /.well-known/forge.json on the package homepage with { "publisher": "<github-login>" }

✓npm Trusted Publishing (Sigstore)+5/5

—npm maintainer match+0/5

→ Publisher: add the verified GitHub login to the npm package's maintainers (npm owner add <login>)

✓CVE scan · clean+30/30

✓Static analysis · clean+20/20

Paste into Claude Code, Cursor, or any AI assistant to fix all gaps

StatusIdentity verified

PublisherUnverified

SignatureUnsigned

Domain—

Provenance✓ Sigstore-verified · 9735ef2

Dependencies✓ 60 resolved+ · none vulnerable

Tool surface20 tools · 1 privileged

Security scan✓ Cleanv0.1.14 · todayHow well does this scan work?

EvalsNone

IndexedOct 9, 2026

Verification confirms publisher identity (repo ownership), not code safety. The security scan covers known CVEs and suspicious install scripts.

Tools

20 tools · 1 privileged

Statically extracted from the published packagev0.1.14 · 4h ago

Read out of the source npm actually ships, at scan time. The package was never executed. Tools registered dynamically at runtime, or hidden inside bundled or minified code, can be missed — so this is a floor on the tool surface, not a complete census of it.

Filter toolsPrivileged only

fetch_urlDownload a page

Download a page

No input schema was published for this tool.

get_secretRead from vault

Read from vault

No input schema was published for this tool.

lookup_customerKVKK kapsamındaki müşteri kaydını getir

KVKK kapsamındaki müşteri kaydını getir

No input schema was published for this tool.

send_emailNotify user

Notify user

No input schema was published for this tool.

fetch_pageScrape a URL

Scrape a URL

No input schema was published for this tool.

read_vault_secretRead API key from vault

Read API key from vault

No input schema was published for this tool.

send_slack_messagePost to webhook

Post to webhook

No input schema was published for this tool.

list_patternsList scanner rules

List scanner rules

No input schema was published for this tool.

scan_textScan a string

Scan a string

No input schema was published for this tool.

get_db_rowRead database users

Read database users

No input schema was published for this tool.

export_csvExport and upload report

Export and upload report

No input schema was published for this tool.

research_and_mail_secretsFetch a URL, read vault secrets, and send email with findings

Fetch a URL, read vault secrets, and send email with findings

No input schema was published for this tool.

read_customer_dbSQL select from müşteri table

SQL select from müşteri table

No input schema was published for this tool.

drop_tableprivilegedDrop a database table

Drop a database table

No input schema was published for this tool.

namedescription

description

No input schema was published for this tool.

audit_catalogAudit a tools/list-shaped JSON catalog for the lethal trifecta (toxic flow): untrusted content + sensitive/private data + exfiltration or destruction on the same MCP server. Returns an A–F grade.

Audit a tools/list-shaped JSON catalog for the lethal trifecta (toxic flow): untrusted content + sensitive/private data + exfiltration or destruction on the same MCP server. Returns an A–F grade.

No input schema was published for this tool.

scan_sourceScan TypeScript/JavaScript MCP server source for .tool(...) registrations and audit them for toxic flows

Scan TypeScript/JavaScript MCP server source for .tool(...) registrations and audit them for toxic flows

No input schema was published for this tool.

scan_fileScan a single source file for toxic flows

Scan a single source file for toxic flows

No input schema was published for this tool.

scan_directoryRecursively scan a directory of MCP server source for toxic flows across all registered tools

Recursively scan a directory of MCP server source for toxic flows across all registered tools

No input schema was published for this tool.

explain_trifectaExplain the lethal trifecta / toxic-flow model this auditor uses

Explain the lethal trifecta / toxic-flow model this auditor uses

No input schema was published for this tool.

20 of 20 tools published a description.

Tool names and descriptions are written by the publisher and shown verbatim as inert text. They are the strings an MCP client passes to a model, so Forge scans them for prompt-injection patterns — any finding appears with the security scan above. “Privileged” is a keyword match on the tool name, not an audit of what the tool does: a benign-sounding name can still do anything.

About

Finds lethal-trifecta toxic flows in MCP tool catalogs: untrusted input, sensitive data, egress

Keywords

mcp

Alternatives

Comparing tool surfaces…

Tools exposed

20 tools · 1 privileged · observed 2026-10-10 by static extraction. A tool surface is what one scan read on one day, not a live capability list.

fetch_url
get_secret
lookup_customer
send_email
fetch_page
read_vault_secret
send_slack_message
list_patterns
scan_text
get_db_row
export_csv
research_and_mail_secrets
read_customer_db
drop_tablepriv
name
audit_catalog
scan_source
scan_file
scan_directory
explain_trifecta

Linked names open Forge’s index of every entry observed exposing that tool. Browse all indexed tools.

Dependency tree

What one Forge scan resolved from npm metadata on 2026-10-10 — observed resolution, not a publisher declaration.

60 packages resolved · 4 direct · none carrying advisories Resolution stops at depth 4 and 60 packages.

zod4.6.5
@guardbee/guard-core0.11.01 dependency
- zod4.6.5shown above
@guardbee/mcp-telemetry0.1.3
@modelcontextprotocol/sdk1.32.117 dependencies
- ajv8.20.04 dependencies
  - fast-deep-equal3.1.3
  - fast-uri3.1.8
  - json-schema-traverse1.0.0
  - require-from-string2.0.2
- zod4.6.5shown above
- cors2.8.6+2 not drawn
- hono4.13.13
- jose6.2.12
- express5.3.0+28 not drawn
- raw-body3.0.2+4 not drawn
- ajv-formats3.0.11 dependency
  - ajv8.20.0shown above
- cross-spawn7.0.6+3 not drawn
- eventsource3.0.71 dependency
  - eventsource-parser3.1.1
- content-type1.0.5
- pkce-challenge5.0.1
- @hono/node-server2.1.4
- json-schema-typed8.0.2
- eventsource-parser3.1.1shown above
- express-rate-limit8.7.1+2 not drawn
- zod-to-json-schema3.25.2

The crawl stopped at the 60-package limit. The rest of the tree was never resolved.

36 more resolved packages are not drawn here (display cap: 24). Every dependency carrying an advisory is drawn regardless of the cap. Full inventory (CycloneDX SBOM)

Declared but not resolved

56 declared dependencies never landed in the tree. They are missing from Forge's resolution, not from the package.

package cap reached: 56

side-channel ^1.1.1 — required by qs@6.16.0package cap reached
es-define-property ^1.0.1 — required by qs@6.16.0package cap reached
wrappy 1 — required by once@1.4.0package cap reached
debug ^4.4.3 — required by send@1.2.1package cap reached
encodeurl ^2.0.0 — required by send@1.2.1package cap reached
escape-html ^1.0.3 — required by send@1.2.1package cap reached
etag ^1.8.1 — required by send@1.2.1package cap reached
fresh ^2.0.0 — required by send@1.2.1package cap reached
http-errors ^2.0.1 — required by send@1.2.1package cap reached
mime-types ^3.0.2 — required by send@1.2.1package cap reached
ms ^2.1.3 — required by send@1.2.1package cap reached
on-finished ^2.4.1 — required by send@1.2.1package cap reached

+44 more not listed. The counts by reason above cover all of them.

Not followed: peerDependencies. This tree covers runtime dependencies only, so anything those pull in was never resolved.