MCP server for Slidingbox: hand a secret from one agent to another as an encrypted, pay-per-read, delivered-once pointer, and pre-flight an x402 endpoint before paying it.
Inferred from the transports this listing declares (stdio). A client not listed here hasn’t been ruled out — it just isn’t something Forge can confirm.
SLIDINGBOX_API_KEYAPI keyoptionalEvaluation key (sbk_<id>.<hmac>) covering a fixed number of free reads. Get one instantly with: curl -X POST https://slidingbox.ai/v1/key
SLIDINGBOX_PRIVATE_KEYAPI keyoptionalBase wallet private key holding USDC. Reads cost $0.02 each, paid per call over x402. Use a wallet funded for this and nothing else.
Declared by the author in the official MCP registry. Forge does not store, broker, or ever see these values — the config below is scaffolded with placeholders you fill in locally.
Verification confirms publisher identity (repo ownership), not code safety. The security scan covers known CVEs and suspicious install scripts.
Read out of the source npm actually ships, at scan time. The package was never executed. Tools registered dynamically at runtime, or hidden inside bundled or minified code, can be missed — so this is a floor on the tool surface, not a complete census of it.
store_secretEncrypt a secret locally and store the ciphertext on Slidingbox. Returns one token that carries both the pointer and the decryption key. Hand that token to whoever should read it: the first read delivers the secret and destroys it. Slidingbox never sees the plaintext or the key.Encrypt a secret locally and store the ciphertext on Slidingbox. Returns one token that carries both the pointer and the decryption key. Hand that token to whoever should read it: the first read delivers the secret and destroys it. Slidingbox never sees the plaintext or the key.
No input schema was published for this tool.
retrieve_secretRead a secret stored on Slidingbox, using the token from store_secret. This destroys it: the token is dead the instant this succeeds, and a second call returns nothing. Reading is paid (x402) unless an evaluation key is configured.Read a secret stored on Slidingbox, using the token from store_secret. This destroys it: the token is dead the instant this succeeds, and a second call returns nothing. Reading is paid (x402) unless an evaluation key is configured.
No input schema was published for this tool.
2 of 2 tools published a description.
Tool names and descriptions are written by the publisher and shown verbatim as inert text. They are the strings an MCP client passes to a model, so Forge scans them for prompt-injection patterns — any finding appears with the security scan above. “Privileged” is a keyword match on the tool name, not an audit of what the tool does: a benign-sounding name can still do anything.
MCP server for Slidingbox: hand a secret from one agent to another as an encrypted, pay-per-read, delivered-once pointer, and pre-flight an x402 endpoint before paying it.
Linked names open Forge’s index of every entry observed exposing that tool. Browse all indexed tools.
The crawl stopped at the 60-package limit. The rest of the tree was never resolved.
36 more resolved packages are not drawn here (display cap: 24). Every dependency carrying an advisory is drawn regardless of the cap. Full inventory (CycloneDX SBOM)
59 declared dependencies never landed in the tree. They are missing from Forge's resolution, not from the package.
+47 more not listed. The counts by reason above cover all of them.
Not followed: peerDependencies. This tree covers runtime dependencies only, so anything those pull in was never resolved.