@toreva/mcp

MCPcommunity
v0.2.0io.github.torevaMITUpdated 26d agonpmGitHub

Policy-checked Solana wallet actions. Users set the limits. Toreva reads, simulates, prepares unsigned transactions, explains, and receipts every outcome.

Works in
ClaudeCursorCopilotGemini

Inferred from the transports this listing declares (stdio). A client not listed here hasn’t been ruled out — it just isn’t something Forge can confirm.

Automatically indexed from public sources. Not yet verified by the developer on Forge.Claim this listing →
41Downloads/wk
26d agoLast update
Package
Authorio.github.toreva
LicenseMIT
Version0.2.0
Sourcenpm+mcp-registry
npm@toreva/mcp
GitHubtoreva/kit
SBOMCycloneDX 1.6 ↓
Trust Status
B
60/100Good
✓Listed in Forge index+10/10
—Publisher identity verified+0/20
→ Publisher: run `forge publish` from the package repo to claim ownership
—Ed25519 publish signature+0/5
→ Included automatically when the publisher runs `forge publish`
—Domain verification+0/5
→ Publisher: host /.well-known/forge.json on the package homepage with { "publisher": "<github-login>" }
—npm Trusted Publishing (Sigstore)+0/5
→ Publish from GitHub Actions with --provenance so the attestation binds this package to this repo
—npm maintainer match+0/5
→ Earned once your identity is verified above and that login is an npm maintainer of this package
✓CVE scan · clean+30/30
✓Static analysis · clean+20/20
Paste into Claude Code, Cursor, or any AI assistant to fix all gaps
StatusCommunity-indexed
PublisherUnverified
SignatureUnsigned
Domain—
Provenance—
Dependencies✓ 60 resolved+ · none vulnerable
Tool surface7 tools · none privileged
Security scan✓ Cleanv0.2.0 · 18d agoHow well does this scan work?
EvalsNone
IndexedAug 28, 2026

Verification confirms publisher identity (repo ownership), not code safety. The security scan covers known CVEs and suspicious install scripts.

Tools

7 tools · none privileged
Statically extracted from the published packagev0.2.0 · 18d ago

Read out of the source npm actually ships, at scan time. The package was never executed. Tools registered dynamically at runtime, or hidden inside bundled or minified code, can be missed — so this is a floor on the tool surface, not a complete census of it.

toreva_establish_agent_walletCreate the agent wallet. The user sets hard limits first. Toreva does not hold the key. Returns a receipt.

Create the agent wallet. The user sets hard limits first. Toreva does not hold the key. Returns a receipt.

No input schema was published for this tool.

toreva_read_or_scanRead or scan one wallet. Say human wallet or agent wallet. No money moves. Returns a receipt.

Read or scan one wallet. Say human wallet or agent wallet. No money moves. Returns a receipt.

No input schema was published for this tool.

toreva_simulate_actionTest the action first. Only use the agent wallet. Show what would happen. Returns a receipt.

Test the action first. Only use the agent wallet. Show what would happen. Returns a receipt.

No input schema was published for this tool.

toreva_prepare_unsigned_transactionPrepare an unsigned transaction. Only after simulation. The user signs elsewhere. No money moves. Returns a receipt.

Prepare an unsigned transaction. Only after simulation. The user signs elsewhere. No money moves. Returns a receipt.

No input schema was published for this tool.

toreva_explain_actionExplain an action or receipt. Use short words. Say what happened. Say why it passed or failed.

Explain an action or receipt. Use short words. Say what happened. Say why it passed or failed.

No input schema was published for this tool.

toreva_get_receiptGet one receipt. Use the receipt id. Show the final outcome. Show the limits used.

Get one receipt. Use the receipt id. Show the final outcome. Show the limits used.

No input schema was published for this tool.

toreva_refuse_actionRefuse an unsafe action. Say the reason. Do not move money. Returns a refusal receipt.

Refuse an unsafe action. Say the reason. Do not move money. Returns a refusal receipt.

No input schema was published for this tool.

7 of 7 tools published a description.

Tool names and descriptions are written by the publisher and shown verbatim as inert text. They are the strings an MCP client passes to a model, so Forge scans them for prompt-injection patterns — any finding appears with the security scan above. “Privileged” is a keyword match on the tool name, not an audit of what the tool does: a benign-sounding name can still do anything.

About

Policy-checked Solana wallet actions. Users set the limits. Toreva reads, simulates, prepares unsigned transactions, explains, and receipts every outcome.

Keywords
solanawallet-policyreceiptsdelegationnon-custodialunsigned-transactionsmcpagent
Alternatives
Comparing tool surfaces…

Tools exposed

7 tools · none privileged · observed by static extraction. A tool surface is what one scan read on one day, not a live capability list.

Linked names open Forge’s index of every entry observed exposing that tool. Browse all indexed tools.

Dependency tree

What one Forge scan resolved from npm metadata on 2026-09-05 — observed resolution, not a publisher declaration.

60 packages resolved · 4 direct · none carrying advisories Resolution stops at depth 4 and 60 packages.

The crawl stopped at the depth-4 limit. Anything below that level was never resolved.

The crawl stopped at the 60-package limit. The rest of the tree was never resolved.

36 more resolved packages are not drawn here (display cap: 24). Every dependency carrying an advisory is drawn regardless of the cap. Full inventory (CycloneDX SBOM)

Declared but not resolved

55 declared dependencies never landed in the tree. They are missing from Forge's resolution, not from the package.

+43 more not listed. The counts by reason above cover all of them.

Not followed: peerDependencies. This tree covers runtime dependencies only, so anything those pull in was never resolved.

Topics

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