@trigguard/mcp-server

MCPcommunity
v1.2.0io.github.TrigGuard-AIUnknownUpdated 1mo agonpmGitHub

Execution authorization for AI agents and automated systems.

Works in
ClaudeCursorCopilotGemini

Inferred from the transports this listing declares (stdio). A client not listed here hasn’t been ruled out — it just isn’t something Forge can confirm.

Automatically indexed from public sources. Not yet verified by the developer on Forge.Claim this listing →
1mo agoLast update
Package
Authorio.github.TrigGuard-AI
LicenseUnknown
Version1.2.0
Sourcenpm+mcp-registry
npm@trigguard/mcp-server
GitHubTrigGuard-AI/TrigGuard
SBOMCycloneDX 1.6 ↓
Trust Status
B
60/100Good
✓Listed in Forge index+10/10
—Publisher identity verified+0/20
→ Publisher: run `forge publish` from the package repo to claim ownership
—Ed25519 publish signature+0/5
→ Included automatically when the publisher runs `forge publish`
—Domain verification+0/5
→ Publisher: host /.well-known/forge.json on the package homepage with { "publisher": "<github-login>" }
—npm Trusted Publishing (Sigstore)+0/5
→ Publish from GitHub Actions with --provenance so the attestation binds this package to this repo
—npm maintainer match+0/5
→ Earned once your identity is verified above and that login is an npm maintainer of this package
✓CVE scan · clean+30/30
✓Static analysis · clean+20/20
Paste into Claude Code, Cursor, or any AI assistant to fix all gaps
StatusCommunity-indexed
PublisherUnverified
SignatureUnsigned
Domain—
Provenance—
Dependencies✓ 60 resolved+ · none vulnerable
Tool surface10 tools · none privileged
Security scan✓ Cleanv1.2.1 · 1mo agoHow well does this scan work?
EvalsNone
IndexedAug 20, 2026

Verification confirms publisher identity (repo ownership), not code safety. The security scan covers known CVEs and suspicious install scripts.

Tools

10 tools · none privileged
Statically extracted from the published packagev1.2.1 · 1mo ago

Read out of the source npm actually ships, at scan time. The package was never executed. Tools registered dynamically at runtime, or hidden inside bundled or minified code, can be missed — so this is a floor on the tool surface, not a complete census of it.

authorize_actionRequest TrigGuard authority for an action. Returns PERMIT, DENY, SILENCE, or ESCALATE with execution receipt metadata and v1.1 explanation fields (reason_code, escalation_*, policy_version, evaluation_id). SILENCE is withhold/no-commitment; ESCALATE is an approval lifecycle. Neither is PERMIT. Requ…

Request TrigGuard authority for an action. Returns PERMIT, DENY, SILENCE, or ESCALATE with execution receipt metadata and v1.1 explanation fields (reason_code, escalation_*, policy_version, evaluation_id). SILENCE is withhold/no-commitment; ESCALATE is an approval lifecycle. Neither is PERMIT. Requ…

No input schema was published for this tool.

verify_receiptVerify a TrigGuard execution receipt by execution id. Optional include_receipt (default false) returns the receipt body. Requires gateway API key for authenticated lookup when the gateway enforces auth.

Verify a TrigGuard execution receipt by execution id. Optional include_receipt (default false) returns the receipt body. Requires gateway API key for authenticated lookup when the gateway enforces auth.

No input schema was published for this tool.

explain_decisionExplain a TrigGuard authority decision using an execution_id and/or a prior authorize_result payload. Returns structured reason_code, missing requirements, and next actions. Read-only — does not authorize.

Explain a TrigGuard authority decision using an execution_id and/or a prior authorize_result payload. Returns structured reason_code, missing requirements, and next actions. Read-only — does not authorize.

No input schema was published for this tool.

get_surfaceRead execution surface registry metadata for one surface id (read-only, no policy evaluation).

Read execution surface registry metadata for one surface id (read-only, no policy evaluation).

No input schema was published for this tool.

list_surfacesList registered execution surfaces from the gateway well-known registry (or local registry override). Read-only discovery.

List registered execution surfaces from the gateway well-known registry (or local registry override). Read-only discovery.

No input schema was published for this tool.

get_policyRead human-readable policy metadata for a surface from the bundled policy artifact. Does NOT evaluate live org policy — call authorize_action for PERMIT/DENY/SILENCE/ESCALATE.

Read human-readable policy metadata for a surface from the bundled policy artifact. Does NOT evaluate live org policy — call authorize_action for PERMIT/DENY/SILENCE/ESCALATE.

No input schema was published for this tool.

list_org_policiesList org policies from the TrigGuard control plane Policy Platform. Requires TRIGGUARD_SESSION_TOKEN + TRIGGUARD_ORG_ID (session JWT rail — not gateway API key alone). Read-only.

List org policies from the TrigGuard control plane Policy Platform. Requires TRIGGUARD_SESSION_TOKEN + TRIGGUARD_ORG_ID (session JWT rail — not gateway API key alone). Read-only.

No input schema was published for this tool.

list_pending_policy_changesList pending policy change requests awaiting approval. Requires TRIGGUARD_SESSION_TOKEN + TRIGGUARD_ORG_ID. Read-only.

List pending policy change requests awaiting approval. Requires TRIGGUARD_SESSION_TOKEN + TRIGGUARD_ORG_ID. Read-only.

No input schema was published for this tool.

preview_policy_intentCompile-only preview of a policy intent against the Policy Platform. Requires TRIGGUARD_SESSION_TOKEN + TRIGGUARD_ORG_ID. Does not persist. Not a substitute for authorize_action.

Compile-only preview of a policy intent against the Policy Platform. Requires TRIGGUARD_SESSION_TOKEN + TRIGGUARD_ORG_ID. Does not persist. Not a substitute for authorize_action.

No input schema was published for this tool.

health_checkCheck TrigGuard gateway reachability, policy engine status, registry hash, and whether API key / session JWT env vars are present (values are never returned).

Check TrigGuard gateway reachability, policy engine status, registry hash, and whether API key / session JWT env vars are present (values are never returned).

No input schema was published for this tool.

10 of 10 tools published a description.

Tool names and descriptions are written by the publisher and shown verbatim as inert text. They are the strings an MCP client passes to a model, so Forge scans them for prompt-injection patterns — any finding appears with the security scan above. “Privileged” is a keyword match on the tool name, not an audit of what the tool does: a benign-sounding name can still do anything.

About

Execution authorization for AI agents and automated systems.

Keywords
mcp
Alternatives
Comparing tool surfaces…

Tools exposed

10 tools · none privileged · observed by static extraction. A tool surface is what one scan read on one day, not a live capability list.

Linked names open Forge’s index of every entry observed exposing that tool. Browse all indexed tools.

Dependency tree

What one Forge scan resolved from npm metadata on 2026-09-05 — observed resolution, not a publisher declaration.

60 packages resolved · 4 direct · none carrying advisories Resolution stops at depth 4 and 60 packages.

The crawl stopped at the 60-package limit. The rest of the tree was never resolved.

36 more resolved packages are not drawn here (display cap: 24). Every dependency carrying an advisory is drawn regardless of the cap. Full inventory (CycloneDX SBOM)

Declared but not resolved

56 declared dependencies never landed in the tree. They are missing from Forge's resolution, not from the package.

+44 more not listed. The counts by reason above cover all of them.

Not followed: peerDependencies. This tree covers runtime dependencies only, so anything those pull in was never resolved.