agent-runtime-guard

MCPcommunity
v1.0.0io.github.DSHCorrectoverElastic-2.0Updated 6d agonpmGitHub

Agent 运行时全栈拦截: allow/deny tool calls, Ed25519 receipts, blocks RCE, theft, SSRF, injection. stdio.

Works in
ClaudeCursorCopilotGemini

Inferred from the transports this listing declares (stdio). A client not listed here hasn’t been ruled out — it just isn’t something Forge can confirm.

Automatically indexed from public sources. Not yet verified by the developer on Forge.Claim this listing →
368Downloads/wk
1GitHub stars
1Forks
6d agoLast update
Package
Authorio.github.DSHCorrectover
LicenseElastic-2.0
Version1.0.0
Sourcenpm+mcp-registry
Trust Status
B
60/100Good
✓Listed in Forge index+10/10
—Publisher identity verified+0/20
→ Publisher: run `forge publish` from the package repo to claim ownership
—Ed25519 publish signature+0/5
→ Included automatically when the publisher runs `forge publish`
—Domain verification+0/5
→ Publisher: host /.well-known/forge.json on the package homepage with { "publisher": "<github-login>" }
—npm Trusted Publishing (Sigstore)+0/5
→ Publish from GitHub Actions with --provenance so the attestation binds this package to this repo
—npm maintainer match+0/5
→ Earned once your identity is verified above and that login is an npm maintainer of this package
✓CVE scan · clean+30/30
✓Static analysis · clean+20/20
Paste into Claude Code, Cursor, or any AI assistant to fix all gaps
StatusCommunity-indexed
PublisherUnverified
SignatureUnsigned
Domain—
Provenance—
Dependencies✓ 0 resolved · none vulnerable
Tool surface8 tools · none privileged
Security scan✓ Cleanv1.2.0 · 1d agoHow well does this scan work?
EvalsNone
IndexedOct 10, 2026

Verification confirms publisher identity (repo ownership), not code safety. The security scan covers known CVEs and suspicious install scripts.

Tools

8 tools · none privileged
Statically extracted from the published packagev1.2.0 · 1d ago

Read out of the source npm actually ships, at scan time. The package was never executed. Tools registered dynamically at runtime, or hidden inside bundled or minified code, can be missed — so this is a floor on the tool surface, not a complete census of it.

ccs_statusReport CCS runtime security guard status: policy configuration, cumulative block/scan statistics, and recent security events. Use this to verify CCS is active and review what has been blocked.

Report CCS runtime security guard status: policy configuration, cumulative block/scan statistics, and recent security events. Use this to verify CCS is active and review what has been blocked.

No input schema was published for this tool.

ccs_auditRun a CCS security audit on installed DSH plugins. Scans plugin source for credential access patterns, command injection risks, and network exfiltration indicators — with runtime-intent analysis (not just keyword matching). Returns per-plugin risk assessment.

Run a CCS security audit on installed DSH plugins. Scans plugin source for credential access patterns, command injection risks, and network exfiltration indicators — with runtime-intent analysis (not just keyword matching). Returns per-plugin risk assessment.

No input schema was published for this tool.

verify_tool_callVerify an AI agent tool call against CCS 7 dimensions (Structure, Schema, Security, Identity, Integrity, Latency, Cost) plus semantic attack-chain analysis and math overflow detection. Returns verdict (allowed/denied) with detailed findings. DEFAULT MODE BLOCKS UNSAFE CALLS.

Verify an AI agent tool call against CCS 7 dimensions (Structure, Schema, Security, Identity, Integrity, Latency, Cost) plus semantic attack-chain analysis and math overflow detection. Returns verdict (allowed/denied) with detailed findings. DEFAULT MODE BLOCKS UNSAFE CALLS.

No input schema was published for this tool.

issue_evidenceIssue a CCS evidence record for a tool call. Evidence is cryptographically bound (content_hash + evidence_hash), tamper-evident, independently verifiable. Issued for allowed AND denied calls.

Issue a CCS evidence record for a tool call. Evidence is cryptographically bound (content_hash + evidence_hash), tamper-evident, independently verifiable. Issued for allowed AND denied calls.

No input schema was published for this tool.

audit_mcp_configAudit an MCP client/server configuration JSON for security risks: plain HTTP, weak secrets, disabled TLS, missing commands. Returns structured issues with severity.

Audit an MCP client/server configuration JSON for security risks: plain HTTP, weak secrets, disabled TLS, missing commands. Returns structured issues with severity.

No input schema was published for this tool.

verify_intent_bindingVerify that actual tool call arguments match a declared intent with zero tolerance. Catches cross-model parameter drift (planner says amount=100, executor writes amount=10000). No LLM needed — pure deterministic comparison. Supports exact match, numeric tolerance, and regex pattern binding modes.

Verify that actual tool call arguments match a declared intent with zero tolerance. Catches cross-model parameter drift (planner says amount=100, executor writes amount=10000). No LLM needed — pure deterministic comparison. Supports exact match, numeric tolerance, and regex pattern binding modes.

No input schema was published for this tool.

verify_receiptOffline-verify a CCS Ed25519-signed receipt. Auditors call this with a receipt JSON produced by issue_evidence or verify_intent_binding; it checks the signature against the embedded signer_public_key and reports whether the body was tampered with. Optionally pin an expected signer public key (PEM s…

Offline-verify a CCS Ed25519-signed receipt. Auditors call this with a receipt JSON produced by issue_evidence or verify_intent_binding; it checks the signature against the embedded signer_public_key and reports whether the body was tampered with. Optionally pin an expected signer public key (PEM s…

No input schema was published for this tool.

locate_tamperingField-level tamper localization. Given an original and a suspect artifact, returns an

Field-level tamper localization. Given an original and a suspect artifact, returns an

No input schema was published for this tool.

8 of 8 tools published a description.

Tool names and descriptions are written by the publisher and shown verbatim as inert text. They are the strings an MCP client passes to a model, so Forge scans them for prompt-injection patterns — any finding appears with the security scan above. “Privileged” is a keyword match on the tool name, not an audit of what the tool does: a benign-sounding name can still do anything.

About

Agent 运行时全栈拦截: allow/deny tool calls, Ed25519 receipts, blocks RCE, theft, SSRF, injection. stdio.

Keywords
mcp
Alternatives
Comparing tool surfaces…

Dependency tree

What one Forge scan resolved from npm metadata on 2026-10-10 — observed resolution, not a publisher declaration.

0 packages resolved · 0 direct · none carrying advisories Resolution stops at depth 4 and 60 packages.

This package declares no runtime dependencies.