Verify Seal AI decision receipts: signed evidence anyone can check, no account needed.
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Verification confirms publisher identity (repo ownership), not code safety. The security scan covers known CVEs and suspicious install scripts.
Read from a real MCP initialize → tools/list handshake against the declared endpoint. No tool was ever invoked — tools/list is the read-only introspection call the protocol defines for this. It reflects what the server advertised at that moment; a hosted endpoint is not pinned to any version and can change without notice.
https://app.aqta.ai/api/mcp10 tools · 529msverify_receiptCheck that a record still says what was signed: the permitted or refused decision, unchanged, under a trusted or embedded key. Handles both formats: ATTESTATION-v1 (a model-call decision) and ACTION-v1 (an agent tool action). No Aqta service in the check.Check that a record still says what was signed: the permitted or refused decision, unchanged, under a trusted or embedded key. Handles both formats: ATTESTATION-v1 (a model-call decision) and ACTION-v1 (an agent tool action). No Aqta service in the check.
| Parameter | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| receipt* | object | string | The record, as a JSON object or a JSON string. |
| public_key | string | Base64url Ed25519 key to trust. Omit to use the key embedded in the record, which proves internal consistency only, never provenance. |
| profile | string | Usually omit this. The record's own signed version tag selects the format, and ATTESTATION-v1 is the default. Pass 'ACTION-v1' only to force an agent-action re… |
decode_receiptRead a receipt field by field, with stated limits. Does not check the signature.Read a receipt field by field, with stated limits. Does not check the signature.
| Parameter | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| receipt* | object | string | — |
get_public_keyFetch the published Seal signing key.Fetch the published Seal signing key.
No input schema was published for this tool.
get_sample_receiptA genuine signed receipt from the sample workspace (demo key), for trying verification.A genuine signed receipt from the sample workspace (demo key), for trying verification.
| Parameter | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| outcome | string | Pick a sample with this outcome. A BLOCKED receipt was signed without the call reaching the provider. |
get_review_packThe published sample evidence pack: fixed review question, bound receipts, disclosure.The published sample evidence pack: fixed review question, bound receipts, disclosure.
| Parameter | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| pack_id | string | Pack id. Only the published "sample" pack is available without an account. |
verify_evidence_packVerify a review pack receipt by receipt. Each verdict comes from the signed envelope itself, never from stored state, and results are per-receipt, never an average.Verify a review pack receipt by receipt. Each verdict comes from the signed envelope itself, never from stored state, and results are per-receipt, never an average.
| Parameter | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| pack | object | string | A pack object, or "sample" for the published sample pack. |
| public_key | string | Key to pin every receipt against. Omit to use each envelope's embedded key. |
explain_attestation_formatThe receipt format: fields, outcomes, verification commands, and what a signature does not establish. Use before describing the format.The receipt format: fields, outcomes, verification commands, and what a signature does not establish. Use before describing the format.
No input schema was published for this tool.
list_my_receiptsList your workspace receipts filtered by outcome, policy, model, or date range. Requires your aqta_ key as Bearer.List your workspace receipts filtered by outcome, policy, model, or date range. Requires your aqta_ key as Bearer.
| Parameter | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| outcome | string | Only receipts with this outcome. |
| policy | string | Only receipts where this policy ran, e.g. pii_scan. |
| model | string | Only receipts for this model. |
| since | string | ISO timestamp lower bound. |
| until | string | ISO timestamp upper bound. |
| limit | number | Max rows, default 25. |
get_transparency_proofInclusion proof plus signed tree head for one of your receipts. Requires your aqta_ key.Inclusion proof plus signed tree head for one of your receipts. Requires your aqta_ key.
| Parameter | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| attestation_id* | string | — |
workspace_summaryOutcome, model and policy counts across your recent receipts. Requires your aqta_ key.Outcome, model and policy counts across your recent receipts. Requires your aqta_ key.
| Parameter | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| limit | number | How many recent receipts to summarise, default 100. |
10 of 10 tools published a description.
Tool names and descriptions are written by the publisher and shown verbatim as inert text. They are the strings an MCP client passes to a model, so Forge scans them for prompt-injection patterns — any finding appears with the security scan above. “Privileged” is a keyword match on the tool name, not an audit of what the tool does: a benign-sounding name can still do anything.
Verify Seal AI decision receipts: signed evidence anyone can check, no account needed.
Linked names open Forge’s index of every entry observed exposing that tool. Browse all indexed tools.
This entry publishes no npm package, so Forge has no dependency tree for it. That is a gap in coverage — not a statement that it has no dependencies.