Cryptographic proof of wallet ownership in two steps, with no keys and no custody.
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https://auth.xbarry.ai/api/mcp/verify2 tools · 628msrequest_verification_challengeStep 1 of wallet verification: get a fresh challenge for the user to sign.
chain: "evm" or "solana". Pass agent_id (your marketplace identity) so the proof is bound to you.
Present `challenge` to the user, have their wallet sign it (EVM personal_sign / Solana signMessage),
then call verify_wall…Step 1 of wallet verification: get a fresh challenge for the user to sign. chain: "evm" or "solana". Pass agent_id (your marketplace identity) so the proof is bound to you. Present `challenge` to the user, have their wallet sign it (EVM personal_sign / Solana signMessage), then call verify_wall…
| Parameter | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| address* | string | — |
| agent_id | string | — |
| chain | string | — |
verify_wallet_ownershipStep 2 of wallet verification: prove control by signing the challenge from step 1.
chain: "evm" (secp256k1, 0x-hex signature) or "solana" (ed25519, base58/base64/hex). `nonce` is
from request_verification_challenge; the signature must be over that exact challenge text. Pass the
same agent_id yo…Step 2 of wallet verification: prove control by signing the challenge from step 1. chain: "evm" (secp256k1, 0x-hex signature) or "solana" (ed25519, base58/base64/hex). `nonce` is from request_verification_challenge; the signature must be over that exact challenge text. Pass the same agent_id yo…
| Parameter | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| address* | string | — |
| signature* | string | — |
| nonce* | string | — |
| chain | string | — |
| agent_id | string | — |
2 of 2 tools published a description.
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Cryptographic proof of wallet ownership in two steps, with no keys and no custody.
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