antideploy-mcp

MCPcommunity
v0.1.3AntideployMITUpdated 3d agonpmGitHub

Deploy an application to Antideploy from a coding agent. MCP server and CLI.

Works in
ClaudeCursorCopilotGemini

Inferred from the transports this listing declares (stdio). A client not listed here hasn’t been ruled out — it just isn’t something Forge can confirm.

Automatically indexed from public sources. Not yet verified by the developer on Forge.Claim this listing →
323Downloads/wk
2GitHub stars
3d agoLast update
Needs 1 credential before it runs
  • ANTIDEPLOY_API_KEYAPI keyrequired

    Antideploy API key for the application, created in the console under the application's settings. Starts with ad_.

Declared by the author in the official MCP registry. Forge does not store, broker, or ever see these values — the config below is scaffolded with placeholders you fill in locally.

Package
AuthorAntideploy
LicenseMIT
Version0.1.3
Sourcenpm+mcp-registry
npmantideploy-mcp
GitHubantideploy/antideploy-mcp
SBOMCycloneDX 1.6 ↓
Trust Status
B
60/100Good
✓Listed in Forge index+10/10
—Publisher identity verified+0/20
→ Publisher: run `forge publish` from the package repo to claim ownership
—Ed25519 publish signature+0/5
→ Included automatically when the publisher runs `forge publish`
—Domain verification+0/5
→ Publisher: host /.well-known/forge.json on the package homepage with { "publisher": "<github-login>" }
—npm Trusted Publishing (Sigstore)+0/5
→ Publish from GitHub Actions with --provenance so the attestation binds this package to this repo
—npm maintainer match+0/5
→ Earned once your identity is verified above and that login is an npm maintainer of this package
✓CVE scan · clean+30/30
✓Static analysis · clean+20/20
Paste into Claude Code, Cursor, or any AI assistant to fix all gaps
StatusCommunity-indexed
PublisherUnverified
SignatureUnsigned
Domain—
Provenance—
Dependencies✓ 60 resolved+ · none vulnerable
Tool surface5 tools · none privileged
Security scan✓ Cleanv0.1.3 · 2d agoHow well does this scan work?
EvalsNone
IndexedSep 21, 2026

Verification confirms publisher identity (repo ownership), not code safety. The security scan covers known CVEs and suspicious install scripts.

Tools

5 tools · none privileged
Statically extracted from the published packagev0.1.3 · 2d ago

Read out of the source npm actually ships, at scan time. The package was never executed. Tools registered dynamically at runtime, or hidden inside bundled or minified code, can be missed — so this is a floor on the tool surface, not a complete census of it.

deployPackage a project directory and deploy it. Sends the whole directory, not

Package a project directory and deploy it. Sends the whole directory, not

No input schema was published for this tool.

deployment_statusProgress for one deployment: status, per-step detail, the analyzed spec,

Progress for one deployment: status, per-step detail, the analyzed spec,

No input schema was published for this tool.

list_envNames only. The platform never returns values, by design.

Names only. The platform never returns values, by design.

No input schema was published for this tool.

set_envStore or replace environment variables for this application. Write-only.

Store or replace environment variables for this application. Write-only.

No input schema was published for this tool.

api_infoThe platform's self-description: endpoints, limits and current behaviour.

The platform's self-description: endpoints, limits and current behaviour.

No input schema was published for this tool.

5 of 5 tools published a description.

Tool names and descriptions are written by the publisher and shown verbatim as inert text. They are the strings an MCP client passes to a model, so Forge scans them for prompt-injection patterns — any finding appears with the security scan above. “Privileged” is a keyword match on the tool name, not an audit of what the tool does: a benign-sounding name can still do anything.

About

Deploy an application to Antideploy from a coding agent. MCP server and CLI.

Keywords
mcpmodel-context-protocoldeploydeploymentpaasclaudecursorcoding-agentantideploy
Alternatives
Comparing tool surfaces…

Tools exposed

5 tools · none privileged · observed by static extraction. A tool surface is what one scan read on one day, not a live capability list.

Linked names open Forge’s index of every entry observed exposing that tool. Browse all indexed tools.

Dependency tree

What one Forge scan resolved from npm metadata on 2026-09-21 — observed resolution, not a publisher declaration.

60 packages resolved · 3 direct · none carrying advisories Resolution stops at depth 4 and 60 packages.

The crawl stopped at the 60-package limit. The rest of the tree was never resolved.

36 more resolved packages are not drawn here (display cap: 24). Every dependency carrying an advisory is drawn regardless of the cap. Full inventory (CycloneDX SBOM)

Declared but not resolved

58 declared dependencies never landed in the tree. They are missing from Forge's resolution, not from the package.

+46 more not listed. The counts by reason above cover all of them.

Not followed: peerDependencies. This tree covers runtime dependencies only, so anything those pull in was never resolved.