api-key-case

MCPattested
v0.9.2MelavernElastic-2.0Updated 6d agonpmGitHub

Keep API keys out of AI coding sessions with local scanning, OS secret storage, and guarded CLI deployment.

Works in
ClaudeCursorCopilotGemini

Inferred from the transports this listing declares (stdio). A client not listed here hasn’t been ruled out — it just isn’t something Forge can confirm.

Attested build
A verified provenance attestation binds this artifact to the listed repository. Nobody has claimed the listing yet — this proves where the code was built, not who stands behind it.
181Downloads/wk
6d agoLast update
Package
AuthorMelavern
LicenseElastic-2.0
Version0.9.2
Sourcenpm+mcp-registry
Trust Status
B
65/100Good
✓Listed in Forge index+10/10
✓Identity verified · attested build+20/20
—Ed25519 publish signature+0/5
→ Included automatically when the publisher runs `forge publish`
—Domain verification+0/5
→ Publisher: host /.well-known/forge.json on the package homepage with { "publisher": "<github-login>" }
✓npm Trusted Publishing (Sigstore)+5/5
—npm maintainer match+0/5
→ Publisher: add the verified GitHub login to the npm package's maintainers (npm owner add <login>)
✓CVE scan · clean+30/30
—Static analysis · clean+0/20
→ Suspicious install scripts or obfuscated code detected
Paste into Claude Code, Cursor, or any AI assistant to fix all gaps
StatusIdentity verified
PublisherUnverified
SignatureUnsigned
Domain—
Provenance✓ Sigstore-verified · 2aeebe0
Dependencies✓ 60 resolved+ · none vulnerable
Tool surface7 tools · none privileged
Security scan⚠ Warnings (1)v0.9.2 · 3d agoHow well does this scan work?
PROMPTtool:deploy_secretExfiltration-shaped instruction
EvalsNone
IndexedOct 2, 2026

Verification confirms publisher identity (repo ownership), not code safety. The security scan covers known CVEs and suspicious install scripts.

Tools

7 tools · none privileged · 1 flagged for injection
Statically extracted from the published packagev0.9.2 · 3d ago

Read out of the source npm actually ships, at scan time. The package was never executed. Tools registered dynamically at runtime, or hidden inside bundled or minified code, can be missed — so this is a floor on the tool surface, not a complete census of it.

list_required_secretsList the environment variable names this project needs, from .env.example and source usage. Never returns values.

List the environment variable names this project needs, from .env.example and source usage. Never returns values.

No input schema was published for this tool.

check_secretReport whether a named secret is registered in the OS secret store. Returns registered/missing only, never the value.

Report whether a named secret is registered in the OS secret store. Returns registered/missing only, never the value.

No input schema was published for this tool.

save_secretNever accepts or stores a value. Returns an action_required response for the Agent-independent `api-key-case save --ask` Human Plane.

Never accepts or stores a value. Returns an action_required response for the Agent-independent `api-key-case save --ask` Human Plane.

No input schema was published for this tool.

deploy_secretinjection riskSend a registered secret to a deploy target via its official CLI. Production (and github, always CI-reachable) never completes here — returns an action_required response for a human to run the CLI and use its separate Human Plane. Terminal input cannot approve it.

Send a registered secret to a deploy target via its official CLI. Production (and github, always CI-reachable) never completes here — returns an action_required response for a human to run the CLI and use its separate Human Plane. Terminal input cannot approve it.

INJECTIONExfiltration-shaped instructionSend a registered secret to a deploy target via its official CLI. Production (and gi…

No input schema was published for this tool.

generate_env_exampleWrite or refresh .env.example with empty-valued keys for every required secret.

Write or refresh .env.example with empty-valued keys for every required secret.

No input schema was published for this tool.

scan_secret_leaksScan the project for possible leaked secret values outside ignored env files. Findings are redacted, never the raw value.

Scan the project for possible leaked secret values outside ignored env files. Findings are redacted, never the raw value.

No input schema was published for this tool.

check_gitignoreReport whether .env and its variants are covered by .gitignore.

Report whether .env and its variants are covered by .gitignore.

No input schema was published for this tool.

7 of 7 tools published a description.

Tool names and descriptions are written by the publisher and shown verbatim as inert text. They are the strings an MCP client passes to a model, so Forge scans them for prompt-injection patterns — any finding appears with the security scan above. “Privileged” is a keyword match on the tool name, not an audit of what the tool does: a benign-sounding name can still do anything.

About

Keep API keys out of AI coding sessions with local scanning, OS secret storage, and guarded CLI deployment.

Keywords
api-keysecretssecret-managementclidotenvsecuritymcpai-agentcloudflarevercelgithub
Alternatives
Comparing tool surfaces…

Dependency tree

What one Forge scan resolved from npm metadata on 2026-10-03 — observed resolution, not a publisher declaration.

60 packages resolved · 6 direct · none carrying advisories Resolution stops at depth 4 and 60 packages.

The crawl stopped at the 60-package limit. The rest of the tree was never resolved.

36 more resolved packages are not drawn here (display cap: 24). Every dependency carrying an advisory is drawn regardless of the cap. Full inventory (CycloneDX SBOM)

Declared but not resolved

57 declared dependencies never landed in the tree. They are missing from Forge's resolution, not from the package.

+45 more not listed. The counts by reason above cover all of them.

Not followed: optionalDependencies, peerDependencies. This tree covers runtime dependencies only, so anything those pull in was never resolved.

Topics

Related in security