# ccs-mcp-server

Runtime verification for agent tool calls: Ed25519 signed receipts, fail-closed RCE/SSRF checks.

- **Type:** MCP server
- **Trust:** 60/100 (B), scored on the package rubric
- **Verification:** community-indexed — nobody has claimed this listing
- **Version:** 1.2.14
- **Author:** io.github.DSHCorrectover
- **License:** Elastic-2.0
- **npm:** ccs-mcp-server
- **Source:** https://github.com/DSHCorrectover/ccs-mcp-server
- **Compatible clients:** claude-code, cursor, copilot, gemini (basis: transport)

## Trust

60/100 (B), scored on the package rubric
- Publisher verified: no
- Install scripts: nothing suspicious found
- Prompt-injection scan: not run
- Obfuscation scan: not run
- Evidence age: 21 days

## Security scan

- **Status:** clean
- **Scanned:** 2026-09-02T09:34:11.596Z
- **Version scanned:** 1.2.7
- **CVEs:** none found by OSV at scan time

## Tools

5 declared. Statically extracted from the shipped source — a floor on the surface, not a census.
- `verify_tool_call` — Verify an AI agent tool call against CCS 7 dimensions (Structure, Schema, Security, Identity, Integrity, Latency, Cost) plus semantic attack-chain analysis and 
- `issue_evidence` — Issue a CCS evidence record for a tool call. Evidence is cryptographically bound (content_hash + evidence_hash), tamper-evident, independently verifiable. Issue
- `audit_mcp_config` — Audit an MCP client/server configuration JSON for security risks: plain HTTP, weak secrets, disabled TLS, missing commands. Returns structured issues with sever
- `verify_intent_binding` — Verify that actual tool call arguments match a declared intent with zero tolerance. Catches cross-model parameter drift (planner says amount=100, executor write
- `verify_receipt` — Offline-verify a CCS Ed25519-signed receipt. Auditors call this with a receipt JSON produced by issue_evidence or verify_intent_binding; it checks the signature

## Install

**Verdict: review** — Installable, but 1 thing to check first: No publisher has proved control of this listing; it is indexed, not vouched for.
**Cautions** (coverage gaps and advisories — never blocking)
- No publisher has proved control of this listing; it is indexed, not vouched for.
**Config** (claude-code):
```json
"{\n  \"mcpServers\": {\n    \"ccs-mcp-server\": {\n      \"command\": \"npx\",\n      \"args\": [\n        \"-y\",\n        \"ccs-mcp-server\"\n      ]\n    }\n  }\n}"
```

## Blast radius

Contained to moderate — no credential declaration found, from the publisher, the upstream registry, or the README. Known so far: runs on your machine; read-only tool surface.
- Floor 11, ceiling 29 (tier: unknown)
- `unknown` means the floor and ceiling land in different bands — not measured enough to name one. It does not mean low.
- This is impact, not likelihood. A high radius is not a defect: a filesystem server is supposed to write files. It is never part of the trust score.

## Machine-readable views of this entry

- Signed JSON: https://forgeregistry.com/api/v1/packages/ccs-mcp-server
- Install plan: https://forgeregistry.com/api/v1/packages/ccs-mcp-server/install-plan
- Alternatives: https://forgeregistry.com/api/v1/alternatives/ccs-mcp-server
- HTML page: https://forgeregistry.com/registry/ccs-mcp-server
- MCP: POST https://forgeregistry.com/api/mcp → `forge_get_package` / `forge_install_plan`

## About this document

Generated by Forge (https://forgeregistry.com) — a compact rendering of the same record served, signed, at the JSON URL above. Trust and scan facts are the registry's own measurements; anything Forge did not measure is named as unmeasured rather than omitted.