Issue & verify signed (ed25519), hash-chained, timestamped provenance receipts for agent actions.
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https://agent-receipts.dropwatchhq.com/mcp3 tools · 308msissue_receiptMint a verifiable provenance receipt for an autonomous-agent action. Returns a signed (ed25519), content-hashed (SHA-256), server-timestamped receipt that is hash-chained to this agent's prior receipts (tamper-evident audit trail). Pass the raw inputs/outputs (we hash them — raw data is never store…Mint a verifiable provenance receipt for an autonomous-agent action. Returns a signed (ed25519), content-hashed (SHA-256), server-timestamped receipt that is hash-chained to this agent's prior receipts (tamper-evident audit trail). Pass the raw inputs/outputs (we hash them — raw data is never store…
| Parameter | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| action* | string | What the agent did, e.g. 'sent_payment' or 'approved_refund' or 'tool_call:search'. |
| agent_id | string | Stable identifier for the acting agent (chains group by this). |
| inputs | — | Raw inputs to the action (any JSON). Hashed to a commitment; raw data not stored. |
| outputs | — | Raw outputs/result of the action (any JSON). Hashed to a commitment; raw data not stored. |
| inputs_hash | string | Alternatively, a pre-computed sha256 hex (or 'sha256:<hex>') of inputs. |
| outputs_hash | string | Alternatively, a pre-computed sha256 hex (or 'sha256:<hex>') of outputs. |
| metadata | object | Optional small key/value context (model, version, request id, etc.). |
verify_receiptVerify a receipt by id (or by passing the full receipt object). Recomputes the content hash, confirms the id commits to the body, and checks the ed25519 signature. Returns the verification checks plus the provenance record (action, agent, input/output hashes, timestamp, chain position). FREE.Verify a receipt by id (or by passing the full receipt object). Recomputes the content hash, confirms the id commits to the body, and checks the ed25519 signature. Returns the verification checks plus the provenance record (action, agent, input/output hashes, timestamp, chain position). FREE.
| Parameter | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| id | string | Receipt id, e.g. 'rcpt_...'. |
| receipt | object | Alternatively, the full receipt object to verify offline-style. |
list_receiptsList the receipt hash-chain for an agent_id, newest first (id, action, timestamp, sequence, hashes, verifyUrl). Use to audit everything a given agent has attested. FREE.List the receipt hash-chain for an agent_id, newest first (id, action, timestamp, sequence, hashes, verifyUrl). Use to audit everything a given agent has attested. FREE.
| Parameter | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| agent_id* | string | The agent whose receipts to list. |
| limit | number | Max receipts (default 25, max 100). |
3 of 3 tools published a description.
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Issue & verify signed (ed25519), hash-chained, timestamped provenance receipts for agent actions.
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