com.free-sign/signing

MCPcommunitylive
v1.0.0com.free-signUnknownUpdated 3mo ago

Free e-signature for humans and AI agents — zero-document PDF signing from hashes only.

Endpoint healthlive
checked 3 days ago · 127ms
100% of the last 6 checks reached this endpoint
Works in
ClaudeCursorCopilotChatGPTGemini

Inferred from the transports this listing declares (streamable-http). A client not listed here hasn’t been ruled out — it just isn’t something Forge can confirm.

Automatically indexed from public sources. Not yet verified by the developer on Forge.Claim this listing →
3mo agoLast update
Package
Authorcom.free-sign
LicenseUnknown
Version1.0.0
Sourcemcp-registry
Trust Status
D
30/100Risk
✓Listed in Forge index+10/10
—Publisher identity verified+0/30
→ Publisher: this listing has no repository on file, so `forge publish` cannot verify ownership automatically. Use "Claim this listing" above — Forge reviews these by hand.
—Domain verification+0/10
→ Not currently available for this listing type — the domain-verification check only runs for npm-backed packages today, so this row cannot be earned here yet regardless of what's hosted at the domain.
—Prompt-injection scan · findings+0/30
→ Publisher: remove instructions in the source aimed at AI clients rather than human readers
✓Obfuscation / exfil scan · clean+20/20
StatusCommunity-indexed
PublisherUnverified
SignatureUnsigned
Domain—
Provenance—
DependenciesNot audited
Tool surface5 tools · none privileged
Security scan⚠ Warnings (1)vlive · 1mo agoHow well does this scan work?
PROMPTtool:get_ots_proofExfiltration-shaped instruction
EvalsNone
IndexedJun 16, 2026

Verification confirms publisher identity (repo ownership), not code safety. The security scan covers known CVEs and suspicious install scripts.

Tools

5 tools · none privileged · 1 flagged for injection
Observed live from the vendor's endpoint1mo ago

Read from a real MCP initialize → tools/list handshake against the declared endpoint. No tool was ever invoked — tools/list is the read-only introspection call the protocol defines for this. It reflects what the server advertised at that moment; a hosted endpoint is not pinned to any version and can change without notice.

  • https://free-sign.com/mcp5 tools · 115ms
create_signing_envelopeCreate a FreeSign envelope from a PDF SHA-256 hash. Do not send PDF bytes. The created envelope is NOT yet session-bound — the browser that opens the returned signing_url generates an ECDSA P-256 keypair locally and POSTs the public JWK to /api/envelopes/{id}/session-bind before any protected reque…

Create a FreeSign envelope from a PDF SHA-256 hash. Do not send PDF bytes. The created envelope is NOT yet session-bound — the browser that opens the returned signing_url generates an ECDSA P-256 keypair locally and POSTs the public JWK to /api/envelopes/{id}/session-bind before any protected reque…

ParameterTypeDescription
document_sha256*stringSHA-256 of the original PDF bytes, computed locally by the user or agent.
verify_document_hashFind FreeSign receipts matching a local document SHA-256 hash.

Find FreeSign receipts matching a local document SHA-256 hash.

ParameterTypeDescription
document_sha256*string—
get_receiptReturn the envelope record (including final_pdf_sha256, final_signature_base64url, final_payload_json), per-signer signing receipts, and OpenTimestamps anchor metadata. Evidence only, never PDF bytes.

Return the envelope record (including final_pdf_sha256, final_signature_base64url, final_payload_json), per-signer signing receipts, and OpenTimestamps anchor metadata. Evidence only, never PDF bytes.

ParameterTypeDescription
envelope_id*string—
get_ots_proofinjection riskReturn the .ots proof (base64) for a given OpenTimestamps anchor on an envelope. Use the official `ots-cli` to verify offline against Bitcoin block headers. Each seal has two anchors: `kind: "byterange"` commits to the signed document, `kind: "signed_attrs"` commits to SHA-256 of the CMS SignedAttr…

Return the .ots proof (base64) for a given OpenTimestamps anchor on an envelope. Use the official `ots-cli` to verify offline against Bitcoin block headers. Each seal has two anchors: `kind: "byterange"` commits to the signed document, `kind: "signed_attrs"` commits to SHA-256 of the CMS SignedAttr…

INJECTIONExfiltration-shaped instructionedAttributes (which carry the post-quantum key commitment).
ParameterTypeDescription
envelope_id*string—
anchor_id*string—
verify_audit_chainReturn an envelope's append-only audit-event hash chain together with a server-computed integrity verdict: every event_hash is recomputed from its canonical material, and the prev_event_hash linkage and per-envelope seq contiguity are checked. Evidence only, never PDF bytes. The raw events are incl…

Return an envelope's append-only audit-event hash chain together with a server-computed integrity verdict: every event_hash is recomputed from its canonical material, and the prev_event_hash linkage and per-envelope seq contiguity are checked. Evidence only, never PDF bytes. The raw events are incl…

ParameterTypeDescription
envelope_id*string—

5 of 5 tools published a description.

Tool names and descriptions are written by the publisher and shown verbatim as inert text. They are the strings an MCP client passes to a model, so Forge scans them for prompt-injection patterns — any finding appears with the security scan above. “Privileged” is a keyword match on the tool name, not an audit of what the tool does: a benign-sounding name can still do anything.

About

Free e-signature for humans and AI agents — zero-document PDF signing from hashes only.

Keywords
mcp
Alternatives
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No dependency coverage

This entry publishes no npm package, so Forge has no dependency tree for it. That is a gap in coverage — not a statement that it has no dependencies.