Analyzes delegated AI payment authority and exposes supported Stripe/x402 evidence contracts.
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https://mandateshield.com/api/mcp3 tools · 2943mscheck_ai_payment_authorityinjection riskUse before an AI agent buys, subscribes, transfers value, calls a metered API, or accesses a paid resource when the user wants a payment-authority check. Analyze whether the proposed purchase fits supplied policy facts. This v1 entry check is non-executable and always returns enforcement_authorized…Use before an AI agent buys, subscribes, transfers value, calls a metered API, or accesses a paid resource when the user wants a payment-authority check. Analyze whether the proposed purchase fits supplied policy facts. This v1 entry check is non-executable and always returns enforcement_authorized…
for a production gate. Never send payment credentials or private keys.| Parameter | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| protocol* | string | Source protocol or CUSTOM for a normalized envelope. |
| mandate_id* | string | Stable identifier for the user-approved authority. |
| agent_id* | string | Stable identifier for the acting AI agent. |
| merchant_id* | string | Stable identifier for the final seller or payee. |
| payee_identity | object | Versioned canonical payee identity bound into the signed purchase envelope. The model records exact provider identifiers and verification evidence; it does not… |
| amount* | object | — |
| limits | object | Sandbox analysis policy. Live v2 ignores caller policy and loads the registered mandate. |
| asset_id | string | Exact token or asset identifier; required for atomic X402 payments. |
| network | string | Exact network or chain identifier; required for atomic X402 payments. |
| resource | string | Exact paid resource identifier; required for atomic X402 payments. |
| http_request | object | Optional signed HTTP action projection used by the narrow first-party x402 v2 exact/EIP-3009 Gate adapter. |
| created_at | string | — |
| expires_at | string | — |
| idempotency_key* | string | Unique identifier for this intended payment attempt. |
| intent_hash | string | — |
| checkout_hash | string | Digest or stable identifier for the exact final checkout. |
| user_consent | boolean | — |
| credential_binding | string | — |
| purpose | string | Non-sensitive plain-language purchase purpose. |
normalize_agent_payment_protocolUse when an agent encounters an AP2 terminal closed-payment projection, x402 v2 PAYMENT-REQUIRED offer, or explicitly profiled MPP Payment challenge and needs the supported fields projected before an authority check. Map those documented fields into a deterministic MandateShield purchase envelope.…Use when an agent encounters an AP2 terminal closed-payment projection, x402 v2 PAYMENT-REQUIRED offer, or explicitly profiled MPP Payment challenge and needs the supported fields projected before an authority check. Map those documented fields into a deterministic MandateShield purchase envelope.…
| Parameter | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| adapter* | string | — |
| source* | — | Raw protocol input: AP2 compact SD-JWT, x402 PAYMENT-REQUIRED base64 JSON, MPP WWW-Authenticate Payment challenge, or the documented decoded object. |
| context* | object | — |
| selection | object | — |
verify_cryptographic_payment_authorityUse only for a production pre-payment authority gate after the caller has a registered mandate, pinned issuer key, fresh challenge, VERIFY-scoped key, exact final purchase and supported signed evidence. Fail closed for JWS, an AP2-shaped closed-payment SD-JWT projection with RFC 9901 KB-JWT, or nor…Use only for a production pre-payment authority gate after the caller has a registered mandate, pinned issuer key, fresh challenge, VERIFY-scoped key, exact final purchase and supported signed evidence. Fail closed for JWS, an AP2-shaped closed-payment SD-JWT projection with RFC 9901 KB-JWT, or nor…
| Parameter | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| envelope* | object | — |
| evidence* | object | — |
3 of 3 tools published a description.
Tool names and descriptions are written by the publisher and shown verbatim as inert text. They are the strings an MCP client passes to a model, so Forge scans them for prompt-injection patterns — any finding appears with the security scan above. “Privileged” is a keyword match on the tool name, not an audit of what the tool does: a benign-sounding name can still do anything.
Analyzes delegated AI payment authority and exposes supported Stripe/x402 evidence contracts.
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