com.openagenda/mcp

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v1.1.1com.openagendaUnknownUpdated 22d agonpmGitHub

Search, analyze and manage events on OpenAgenda.

An MCP server exposing the OpenAgenda v3 API to LLM clients via the code-mode pattern: two tools — (find the right operation) and (run code against the API) — instead of one tool per endpoint. runs arbitrary caller code against the v3 surface (reads and write/admin/moderation), so the sandbox egress boundary, per-caller OAuth scoping and human-gated destructive tools are what bound what it can…

Automatically indexed from public sources. Not yet verified by the developer on Forge.Claim this listing →
22d agoLast update
Package
Authorcom.openagenda
LicenseUnknown
Version1.1.1
Sourcemcp-registry
npm@openagenda/mcp
GitHubOpenAgenda/oa-public
Trust Status
B
60/100Good
✓Listed in Forge index+10/10
—Publisher identity verified+0/25
→ Publisher: run `forge publish` from the package repo to claim ownership
—Ed25519 publish signature+0/10
→ Included automatically when the publisher runs `forge publish`
—Domain verification+0/5
→ Publisher: host /.well-known/forge.json on the package homepage with { "publisher": "<github-login>" }
✓CVE scan · clean+30/30
✓Static analysis · clean+20/20
—npm provenance (Sigstore)+0/5
→ Publish from GitHub Actions with the --provenance flag
Paste into Claude Code, Cursor, or any AI assistant to fix all gaps
StatusCommunity-indexed
PublisherUnverified
SignatureUnsigned
Domain—
Provenance—
Dependencies✓ 60 resolved+ · none vulnerable
Tool surface—
Security scan✓ Cleanv1.1.1 · 20d ago
EvalsNone
IndexedJun 13, 2026

Verification confirms publisher identity (repo ownership), not code safety. The security scan covers known CVEs and suspicious install scripts — it cannot prove the absence of malicious code.

About

An MCP server exposing the OpenAgenda v3 API to LLM clients via the code-mode pattern: two tools — (find the right operation) and (run code against the API) — instead of one tool per endpoint. runs arbitrary caller code against the v3 surface (reads and write/admin/moderation), so the sandbox egress boundary, per-caller OAuth scoping and human-gated destructive tools are what bound what it can do. ⚠️ Deployed as the hosted, multi-tenant server (, OAuth-enforced). The hosted policy layer (µVM…

Keywords
mcp