# com.scrubmytext/tools 49 deterministic tools for text integrity, agent control, and contextual quality evidence. - **Type:** MCP server - **Trust:** 60/100 (B), scored on the content rubric - **Verification:** community-indexed — nobody has claimed this listing - **Version:** 7.5.0 - **Author:** com.scrubmytext - **License:** Unknown - **Endpoints:** streamable-http https://api.scrubmytext.com/mcp - **Source:** https://api.scrubmytext.com/mcp - **Endpoint health:** reachable (last checked 2026-09-25T21:50:06.256Z, 5 samples) — uptime is not a security property and is not part of the trust score - **Compatible clients:** claude-code, cursor, copilot, chatgpt, gemini (basis: transport) ## Trust 60/100 (B), scored on the content rubric - Publisher verified: no - Install scripts: nothing suspicious found - Prompt-injection scan: clean - Obfuscation scan: clean - Evidence age: 0 days ## Security scan - **Status:** clean - **Scanned:** 2026-09-25T21:50:06.256Z - **Version scanned:** live - **CVEs:** no coverage — this entry has no package coordinates to query OSV against, so "no known CVEs" is NOT asserted for it. **Findings** - injection-shaped content (note) in the `validate_output` tool: Imperative addressed to the AI model ## Tools 49 declared. Observed from a live `tools/list` probe. - `scrub_text` — Normalize hidden/control characters and formatting artifacts without rewriting wording. Free or paid. - `inspect_text` — Inspect exact Unicode, invisible characters, normalization, and mixed-script anomalies. Free or paid. - `scan_untrusted_text` — Use before an agent ingests pasted, retrieved, uploaded, or externally supplied text. Returns structural and heuristic risk signals; it does not determine malic - `redact_sensitive_text` — Use before storing, sharing, logging, or sending text downstream when it may contain credentials or identifiers. Pattern-based redaction; trial, subscription, o - `compare_text` — Use to verify what changed between two text versions and whether differences are only scrub/format artifacts. Trial, subscription, or x402 pay-per-call. - `detect_secrets` — Use before an agent logs, stores, or forwards text that may contain credentials. Finds likely API keys, private keys, JWTs, cloud credentials, and secret patter - `validate_output` — Use immediately before a downstream action when model output must be valid JSON or match a schema. Trial, subscription, or x402 pay-per-call. - `sanitize_agent_context` — Use before putting untrusted retrieved or uploaded text into a model context. Normalizes structural artifacts, returns risk signals, and can redact sensitive pa - `prepare_for_agent` — Use as the default preprocessing step before an AI agent consumes untrusted external text. Returns agent-ready text plus inspection, risk-scan, and secret-detec - `rework_text` — Use when an agent needs a deterministic, no-LLM rewrite while preserving protected facts such as numbers, URLs, emails, and quotes. Returns change metrics and p - `fingerprint_action` — Use before retryable work to derive a stable SHA-256 action fingerprint and idempotency key from an action name, optional scope, and JSON arguments. Object key - `lock_action` — Use immediately before a consequential agent action to atomically claim an idempotency key so retries cannot execute it twice. Subscription API key required. - `lock_action_intent` — Use immediately before a consequential retryable action when no stable idempotency key exists. Deterministically fingerprints the action and arguments, atomical - `check_action` — Use to inspect an idempotency key before or after an agent action. Subscription API key required. - `complete_action` — Paid: mark the current lock completed and preserve the idempotency record for its configured retention period. - `release_action` — Paid: release an uncompleted action lock using its lock_id so another attempt can safely acquire it. - `create_signal` — Use when an agent must wait for an external callback, webhook, job completion, or asynchronous event. Subscription API key required. - `get_signal_events` — Paid: retrieve events received by a temporary signal inbox in arrival order. - `delete_signal` — Paid: immediately delete a signal inbox and all stored event bodies. - `request_approval` — Use when an agent needs independent human approval before a consequential action. Creates a secure approval link. Subscription API key required. - `check_approval` — Paid: check whether a human approval request is pending, approved, rejected, expired, or cancelled. - `cancel_approval` — Paid: cancel a pending human approval request so its link can no longer approve the action. - `manage_action_challenge` — Create, inspect, consume, or cancel a digest-bound cooling-off window. A bearer challenger can veto before the deadline; afterward the owner can atomically cons - `reserve_action_budget` — Atomically reserve integer units under a named, period-scoped ceiling. A reservation_key makes retries idempotent. The service stores hashes and counters, not p - `record_action_receipt` — Create or retrieve an immutable receipt digest for an action outcome without storing the action or outcome payload. Production; subscription API key required. - `verify_signed_signal` — Verify an HMAC-SHA256 signal, enforce timestamp freshness, and reject a replayed nonce. The message and shared secret are never stored. Production; subscription - `manage_resource_lease` — Atomically acquire, inspect, or release a short-lived exclusive lease on a hashed resource key. Production; subscription API key required. - `manage_authority_delegation` — Issue, consume, inspect, or revoke a narrow bearer capability bound to one action fingerprint and a maximum use count. This is a technical capability, not ident - `manage_agent_stop` — Set, inspect, or clear a durable stop signal for a hashed agent or workflow key. Callers should fail closed whenever stopped is true. Production; subscription A - `manage_task_handoff` — Create a bearer-token task handoff, let another paid API identity claim it exactly once, and inspect, complete, or cancel the transfer. Only task fingerprints a - `manage_action_reconciliation` — Open, inspect, append digest-only evidence to, or resolve a discrepancy between expected and observed action outcomes. Production; subscription API key required - `anchor_context_trace` — Create or inspect an immutable provenance anchor from a context digest, parent digests, and processing stage. No context content is stored. Production; subscrip - `manage_task_contract` — Offer, accept, inspect, complete, or cancel a digest-bound technical task commitment. This records service state; it is not a legal contract, escrow, payment, o - `check_agent_readiness` — Deterministically check a supplied MCP server card against a narrow, published integration contract. The service does not fetch arbitrary URLs and does not cert - `manage_action_quorum` — Create, inspect, consume, or cancel an N-of-M bearer authorization quorum. Each unique bearer can decide once; only a successful one-time consume grants an exec - `manage_task_deadline` — Create, inspect, complete, or cancel a task deadline whose due and escalation state is derived from an independent server clock even when the agent is offline. - `manage_attention_budget` — Create, inspect, reserve, release, or close a finite review-capacity pool with per-subject caps, retry-safe reservations, and protected priority capacity. Subsc - `manage_agent_escalation` — Create, inspect, or cancel a digest-only incident with a private bearer operator link and deterministic response and resolution SLA state. Link delivery remains - `manage_terms_pin` — Pin, inspect, or revoke an immutable digest-bound record of observed terms, interface, version, and price. Stores bounded metadata and digests, not the terms bo - `match_policy_requirements` — Deterministically compare bounded provider capabilities with consumer-required and forbidden policy tokens. Processes supplied tokens without storing policy con - …and 9 more ## Install **Verdict: review** — Installable, but 2 things to check first: No CVE coverage: this entry has no npm/PyPI coordinates to query OSV against, so "no known vulnerabilities" is not a claim that can be made about it. **Cautions** (coverage gaps and advisories — never blocking) - No CVE coverage: this entry has no npm/PyPI coordinates to query OSV against, so "no known vulnerabilities" is not a claim that can be made about it. - No publisher has proved control of this listing; it is indexed, not vouched for. **Config** (claude-code): ```json "{\n \"mcpServers\": {\n \"tools\": {\n \"type\": \"http\",\n \"url\": \"https://api.scrubmytext.com/mcp\"\n }\n }\n}" ``` ## Blast radius Moderate to extensive — no credential declaration found, from the publisher, the upstream registry, or the README. Known so far: deletes data; runs on someone else's infrastructure. - Floor 32, ceiling 56 (tier: unknown) - `unknown` means the floor and ceiling land in different bands — not measured enough to name one. It does not mean low. - This is impact, not likelihood. A high radius is not a defect: a filesystem server is supposed to write files. It is never part of the trust score. ## Machine-readable views of this entry - Signed JSON: https://forgeregistry.com/api/v1/packages/com.scrubmytext%2Ftools - Install plan: https://forgeregistry.com/api/v1/packages/com.scrubmytext%2Ftools/install-plan - Alternatives: https://forgeregistry.com/api/v1/alternatives/com.scrubmytext%2Ftools - HTML page: https://forgeregistry.com/registry/com.scrubmytext%2Ftools - MCP: POST https://forgeregistry.com/api/mcp → `forge_get_package` / `forge_install_plan` ## About this document Generated by Forge (https://forgeregistry.com) — a compact rendering of the same record served, signed, at the JSON URL above. Trust and scan facts are the registry's own measurements; anything Forge did not measure is named as unmeasured rather than omitted.