gam-seller-mcp-node

MCPcommunity
v0.11.1io.github.juan-sibboMITUpdated 5d agonpmGitHub

Governed MCP seller node: buyer agents discover inventory and register intents; no ad-server writes

Works in
ClaudeCursorCopilotGemini

Inferred from the transports this listing declares (stdio). A client not listed here hasn’t been ruled out — it just isn’t something Forge can confirm.

Automatically indexed from public sources. Not yet verified by the developer on Forge.Claim this listing →
821Downloads/wk
1Forks
5d agoLast update
Package
Authorio.github.juan-sibbo
LicenseMIT
Version0.11.1
Sourcenpm+mcp-registry
npmgam-seller-mcp-node
GitHubjuan-sibbo/gam-seller-mcp-node
SBOMCycloneDX 1.6 ↓
Trust Status
B
60/100Good
✓Listed in Forge index+10/10
—Publisher identity verified+0/20
→ Publisher: run `forge publish` from the package repo to claim ownership
—Ed25519 publish signature+0/5
→ Included automatically when the publisher runs `forge publish`
—Domain verification+0/5
→ Publisher: host /.well-known/forge.json on the package homepage with { "publisher": "<github-login>" }
—npm Trusted Publishing (Sigstore)+0/5
→ Publish from GitHub Actions with --provenance so the attestation binds this package to this repo
—npm maintainer match+0/5
→ Earned once your identity is verified above and that login is an npm maintainer of this package
✓CVE scan · clean+30/30
✓Static analysis · clean+20/20
Paste into Claude Code, Cursor, or any AI assistant to fix all gaps
StatusCommunity-indexed
PublisherUnverified
SignatureUnsigned
Domain—
Provenance—
Dependencies✓ 60 resolved+ · none vulnerable
Tool surface5 tools · none privileged
Security scan✓ Cleanv0.8.3 · 1mo agoHow well does this scan work?
EvalsNone
IndexedAug 11, 2026

Verification confirms publisher identity (repo ownership), not code safety. The security scan covers known CVEs and suspicious install scripts.

Tools

5 tools · none privileged
Statically extracted from the published packagev0.8.3 · 1mo ago

Read out of the source npm actually ships, at scan time. The package was never executed. Tools registered dynamically at runtime, or hidden inside bundled or minified code, can be missed — so this is a floor on the tool surface, not a complete census of it.

well_known_capabilitiesNo description published

This tool published no description. Forge does not invent one.

discover_productsNo description published

This tool published no description. Forge does not invent one.

get_forecastNo description published

This tool published no description. Forge does not invent one.

create_intentNo description published

This tool published no description. Forge does not invent one.

revoke_intentNo description published

This tool published no description. Forge does not invent one.

0 of 5 tools published a description.

Tool names and descriptions are written by the publisher and shown verbatim as inert text. They are the strings an MCP client passes to a model, so Forge scans them for prompt-injection patterns — any finding appears with the security scan above. “Privileged” is a keyword match on the tool name, not an audit of what the tool does: a benign-sounding name can still do anything.

About

Governed MCP seller node: buyer agents discover inventory and register intents; no ad-server writes

Keywords
mcpmcp-servermodel-context-protocolgoogle-ad-managergamadtechprogrammatic-advertisingagentic-advertisingagentic-aiai-agentllmsellersell-sidepublisherad-inventoryinventorytypescriptgdprprivacypublicidad-agenticapublicidad-programatica
Alternatives
Comparing tool surfaces…

Tools exposed

5 tools · none privileged · observed by static extraction. A tool surface is what one scan read on one day, not a live capability list.

Linked names open Forge’s index of every entry observed exposing that tool. Browse all indexed tools.

No dependency coverage

This package was last scanned before Forge began storing the resolved tree. The next scan will record it.