io.github.CSOAI-ORG/firmware-attestation-mcp

MCPcommunity
v1.0.1io.github.CSOAI-ORGUnknownUpdated 20d agoGitHub

Firmware Attestation MCP — hardware trust layer for sovereign AI. Scan firmware, check

Hardware trust layer for sovereign AI. Persistence implants live below the OS (BIOS/UEFI, SMM, network boot ROMs, HDD HPA) and survive OS reinstalls and disk wipes. This MCP attests a host's firmware trust state and gates inference on a verified result. | read-only host evidence (Secure Boot, TPM, SIP, BIOS, HPA) | | match to NSA-ANT-class persistence preconditions + defenses | | HMAC-signed…

Automatically indexed from public sources. Not yet verified by the developer on Forge.Claim this listing →
20d agoLast update
Package
Authorio.github.CSOAI-ORG
LicenseUnknown
Version1.0.1
Sourcemcp-registry
Trust Status
B
60/100Good
Listed in Forge index+10/10
Publisher identity verified+0/25
Publisher: run `forge publish` from the package repo to claim ownership
Ed25519 publish signature+0/10
Included automatically when the publisher runs `forge publish`
Domain verification+0/5
Publisher: host /.well-known/forge.json on the package homepage with { "publisher": "<github-login>" }
CVE scan · clean+30/30
Static analysis · clean+20/20
npm provenance (Sigstore)+0/5
Publish from GitHub Actions with the --provenance flag
Paste into Claude Code, Cursor, or any AI assistant to fix all gaps
StatusCommunity-indexed
PublisherUnverified
SignatureUnsigned
Domain
Provenance
DependenciesNot audited
Tool surface
Security scan✓ Cleanv1.0.2 · 19d ago
EvalsNone
IndexedJun 13, 2026

Verification confirms publisher identity (repo ownership), not code safety. The security scan covers known CVEs and suspicious install scripts — it cannot prove the absence of malicious code.

About

Hardware trust layer for sovereign AI. Persistence implants live below the OS (BIOS/UEFI, SMM, network boot ROMs, HDD HPA) and survive OS reinstalls and disk wipes. This MCP attests a host's firmware trust state and gates inference on a verified result. | read-only host evidence (Secure Boot, TPM, SIP, BIOS, HPA) | | match to NSA-ANT-class persistence preconditions + defenses | | HMAC-signed attestation, verifiable at | | ALLOW/BLOCK AI on this host (strict by default) | | the attack surface…

Keywords
mcp