MCP server for credential isolation — bots use passwords and API keys without seeing them
MCP server for credential isolation in LLM agents. Your bot uses passwords and API keys — but never sees them. AI agents are getting real access to real systems. They log into websites, call APIs, manage infrastructure. The standard pattern is dangerous: That API key is now in the LLM's context window, conversation logs, provider's training pipeline (maybe), and any tool that reads the…
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vault_loginNo description publishedThis tool published no description. Forge does not invent one.
vault_api_requestNo description publishedThis tool published no description. Forge does not invent one.
vault_listNo description publishedThis tool published no description. Forge does not invent one.
vault_statusNo description publishedThis tool published no description. Forge does not invent one.
vault_addNo description publishedThis tool published no description. Forge does not invent one.
vault_removeprivilegedNo description publishedThis tool published no description. Forge does not invent one.
vault_updateNo description publishedThis tool published no description. Forge does not invent one.
vault_checkNo description publishedThis tool published no description. Forge does not invent one.
vault_importNo description publishedThis tool published no description. Forge does not invent one.
vault_templatesNo description publishedThis tool published no description. Forge does not invent one.
0 of 10 tools published a description.
Tool names and descriptions are written by the publisher and shown verbatim as inert text. They are the strings an MCP client passes to a model, so Forge scans them for prompt-injection patterns — any finding appears with the security scan above. “Privileged” is a keyword match on the tool name, not an audit of what the tool does: a benign-sounding name can still do anything.
MCP server for credential isolation in LLM agents. Your bot uses passwords and API keys — but never sees them. AI agents are getting real access to real systems. They log into websites, call APIs, manage infrastructure. The standard pattern is dangerous: That API key is now in the LLM's context window, conversation logs, provider's training pipeline (maybe), and any tool that reads the conversation. One leaked prompt — and your credentials are exposed. Vault MCP solves this with a simple…
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