Intent-bound action authorization for AI agents: policy, human approval, and a signed audit trail.
Website: delegohq.com · Docs: delegohq.com/docs · Spec: Delego-Dev/specification Intent-bound action authorization for AI agents. It sits between an agent and whatever credential broker holds the user's secrets, and it answers the one question brokers don't: is this specific action the thing the human actually 📜 Protocol: delego implements protocol 0.3 of the open delego wire specification —…
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Website: delegohq.com · Docs: delegohq.com/docs · Spec: Delego-Dev/specification Intent-bound action authorization for AI agents. It sits between an agent and whatever credential broker holds the user's secrets, and it answers the one question brokers don't: is this specific action the thing the human actually 📜 Protocol: delego implements protocol 0.3 of the open delego wire specification — canonicalization, the policy schema, intent/fingerprint binding including the §4.2 query-fold, and the…
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