Pre-execution policy gate for consequential agent actions with durable trust receipts.
Inferred from the transports this listing declares (streamable-http). A client not listed here hasn’t been ruled out — it just isn’t something Forge can confirm.
Verification confirms publisher identity (repo ownership), not code safety. The security scan covers known CVEs and suspicious install scripts.
Read out of the source npm actually ships, at scan time. The package was never executed. Tools registered dynamically at runtime, or hidden inside bundled or minified code, can be missed — so this is a floor on the tool surface, not a complete census of it.
release_vendor_paymentRelease vendor payment after deliveryRelease vendor payment after delivery
No input schema was published for this tool.
send_email_to_customerSend an account notice to a customerSend an account notice to a customer
No input schema was published for this tool.
check_order_statusRead a demo order status in a sandboxRead a demo order status in a sandbox
No input schema was published for this tool.
releaseVendorPaymentRelease a vendor payment from the production payment system.Release a vendor payment from the production payment system.
No input schema was published for this tool.
4 of 4 tools published a description.
Tool names and descriptions are written by the publisher and shown verbatim as inert text. They are the strings an MCP client passes to a model, so Forge scans them for prompt-injection patterns — any finding appears with the security scan above. “Privileged” is a keyword match on the tool name, not an audit of what the tool does: a benign-sounding name can still do anything.
Pre-execution policy gate for consequential agent actions with durable trust receipts.
Linked names open Forge’s index of every entry observed exposing that tool. Browse all indexed tools.
This entry publishes no npm package, so Forge has no dependency tree for it. That is a gap in coverage — not a statement that it has no dependencies.