PoC: Open Registry supply chain — unvetted server listing (security research)
Benign PoC for the Open Registry Supply Chain Risk finding: anyone with npm + GitHub can publish an MCP server to the open registry (registry.modelcontextprotocol.io) with no pre-publication review. Server: Minimal benign MCP stdio server (one tool, no sensitive behavior). Follow STEPBYSTEP.md to run the exploit and prove unvetted listing.
Inferred from the transports this listing declares (stdio). A client not listed here hasn’t been ruled out — it just isn’t something Forge can confirm.
Verification confirms publisher identity (repo ownership), not code safety. The security scan covers known CVEs and suspicious install scripts.
Read out of the source npm actually ships, at scan time. The package was never executed. Tools registered dynamically at runtime, or hidden inside bundled or minified code, can be missed — so this is a floor on the tool surface, not a complete census of it.
helloNo description publishedThis tool published no description. Forge does not invent one.
0 of 1 tools published a description.
Tool names and descriptions are written by the publisher and shown verbatim as inert text. They are the strings an MCP client passes to a model, so Forge scans them for prompt-injection patterns — any finding appears with the security scan above. “Privileged” is a keyword match on the tool name, not an audit of what the tool does: a benign-sounding name can still do anything.
Benign PoC for the Open Registry Supply Chain Risk finding: anyone with npm + GitHub can publish an MCP server to the open registry (registry.modelcontextprotocol.io) with no pre-publication review. Server: Minimal benign MCP stdio server (one tool, no sensitive behavior). Follow STEPBYSTEP.md to run the exploit and prove unvetted listing.
Linked names open Forge’s index of every entry observed exposing that tool. Browse all indexed tools.
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