GitHub Actions workflow security audit - 21 checks: pinning, permissions, secrets, injection.
MCP server that audits files for supply-chain risks. Catches script injection, leaked tokens, unpinned actions, broad permissions, and foot-guns — the patterns behind several 2024–2025 supply-chain incidents. Built by Unbearable Labs. Pay-per-event — only billed when a tool is actually called. Apify Actor Store — primary, metered usage (PPE) MCPize — pending submission MCP.so — pending submission…
Inferred from the transports this listing declares (streamable-http). A client not listed here hasn’t been ruled out — it just isn’t something Forge can confirm.
Verification confirms publisher identity (repo ownership), not code safety. The security scan covers known CVEs and suspicious install scripts.
Forge read 0 source files from the repository archive and matched no MCP tool registrations. Extraction is pattern-based over shipped source: a server that builds its tool list at runtime, or that ships only bundled or minified code, registers nothing this can see. Treat it as “not detected”, not as “exposes none”.
MCP server that audits files for supply-chain risks. Catches script injection, leaked tokens, unpinned actions, broad permissions, and foot-guns — the patterns behind several 2024–2025 supply-chain incidents. Built by Unbearable Labs. Pay-per-event — only billed when a tool is actually called. Apify Actor Store — primary, metered usage (PPE) MCPize — pending submission MCP.so — pending submission PulseMCP — pending submission Smithery — pending submission Glama — pending submission Newsletter:…
This entry publishes no npm package, so Forge has no dependency tree for it. That is a gap in coverage — not a statement that it has no dependencies.