Prompt injection + PII detection for LLM apps and agent pipelines. Deterministic, sub-25ms.
MCP server that exposes Zentric Protocol — prompt injection and PII detection — as a native tool for any MCP-compatible agent (Claude Desktop, Cursor, Windsurf, and any other client that speaks the Model Context Protocol). One tool, . Call it before your agent acts on any input the user didn't directly type — webpage content, RAG retrievals, tool outputs, sub-agent responses, file uploads,…
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Forge read 1 source file from the published package tarball and matched no MCP tool registrations. Extraction is pattern-based over shipped source: a server that builds its tool list at runtime, or that ships only bundled or minified code, registers nothing this can see. Treat it as “not detected”, not as “exposes none”.
MCP server that exposes Zentric Protocol — prompt injection and PII detection — as a native tool for any MCP-compatible agent (Claude Desktop, Cursor, Windsurf, and any other client that speaks the Model Context Protocol). One tool, . Call it before your agent acts on any input the user didn't directly type — webpage content, RAG retrievals, tool outputs, sub-agent responses, file uploads, anything an attacker could plant in the pipeline. Indirect prompt injection is the dominant attack surface…
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