io.github.cdrn/sigil

MCPattested
v0.0.6io.github.cdrnUnknownUpdated 4mo agonpmGitHub

Local keystore + MCP server. Claude can sign EVM transactions but never sees the private key.

Claude can sign, but never see. is a local signing tool and Claude Code integration that lets agentic coding tools use private keys without ever putting key material in the model's context window. Status: pre-alpha. The MCP server, CLI, unlock flow, ward hooks, and policy engine (static checks) all work end-to-end. Out-of-band confirmation, rolling-window value caps, and EIP-712 domain allowlists…

Works in
ClaudeCursorCopilotGemini

Inferred from the transports this listing declares (stdio). A client not listed here hasn’t been ruled out — it just isn’t something Forge can confirm.

Attested build
A verified provenance attestation binds this artifact to the listed repository. Nobody has claimed the listing yet — this proves where the code was built, not who stands behind it.
3GitHub stars
4mo agoLast update
Package
Authorio.github.cdrn
LicenseUnknown
Version0.0.6
Sourcemcp-registry
Trust Status
A
85/100Trusted
✓Listed in Forge index+10/10
✓Identity verified · attested build+20/20
—Ed25519 publish signature+0/5
→ Included automatically when the publisher runs `forge publish`
—Domain verification+0/5
→ Publisher: host /.well-known/forge.json on the package homepage with { "publisher": "<github-login>" }
✓npm Trusted Publishing (Sigstore)+5/5
—npm maintainer match+0/5
→ Publisher: add the verified GitHub login to the npm package's maintainers (npm owner add <login>)
✓CVE scan · clean+30/30
✓Static analysis · clean+20/20
Paste into Claude Code, Cursor, or any AI assistant to fix all gaps
StatusIdentity verified
PublisherUnverified
SignatureUnsigned
Domain—
Provenance✓ Sigstore-verified · 01737ed
Dependencies✓ 5 resolved · none vulnerable
Tool surface4 tools · none privileged
Security scan✓ Cleanv0.0.8 · 3mo agoHow well does this scan work?
PROMPTdescriptionImperative addressed to the AI model
EvalsNone
IndexedJun 13, 2026

Verification confirms publisher identity (repo ownership), not code safety. The security scan covers known CVEs and suspicious install scripts.

Tools

4 tools · none privileged
Statically extracted from the published packagev0.0.8 · 3mo ago

Read out of the source npm actually ships, at scan time. The package was never executed. Tools registered dynamically at runtime, or hidden inside bundled or minified code, can be missed — so this is a floor on the tool surface, not a complete census of it.

sigil_list_portalsNo description published

This tool published no description. Forge does not invent one.

sigil_eth_sign_messageNo description published

This tool published no description. Forge does not invent one.

sigil_eth_sign_transactionNo description published

This tool published no description. Forge does not invent one.

sigil_eth_sign_typed_dataNo description published

This tool published no description. Forge does not invent one.

0 of 4 tools published a description.

Tool names and descriptions are written by the publisher and shown verbatim as inert text. They are the strings an MCP client passes to a model, so Forge scans them for prompt-injection patterns — any finding appears with the security scan above. “Privileged” is a keyword match on the tool name, not an audit of what the tool does: a benign-sounding name can still do anything.

About

Claude can sign, but never see. is a local signing tool and Claude Code integration that lets agentic coding tools use private keys without ever putting key material in the model's context window. Status: pre-alpha. The MCP server, CLI, unlock flow, ward hooks, and policy engine (static checks) all work end-to-end. Out-of-band confirmation, rolling-window value caps, and EIP-712 domain allowlists are not yet implemented. Until they land — and until the supply-chain attestations promised for…

Keywords
mcp
Alternatives
Comparing tool surfaces…

No dependency coverage

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