io.github.getaegis/aegis

MCPattested
v1.0.3io.github.getaegisUnknownUpdated 4mo agonpmGitHub

Credential isolation for AI agents. Inject secrets at the network boundary.

Stop putting API keys where AI agents can read them. Aegis is a local-first credential isolation proxy for AI agents. It sits between your agent and the APIs it calls — injecting secrets at the network boundary so the agent never sees, stores, or transmits real credentials. AI agents (Claude, GPT, Cursor, custom bots) increasingly call real APIs — Slack, GitHub, Stripe, databases. The current…

Attested build
A verified provenance attestation binds this artifact to the listed repository. Nobody has claimed the listing yet — this proves where the code was built, not who stands behind it.
4mo agoLast update
Package
Authorio.github.getaegis
LicenseUnknown
Version1.0.3
Sourcemcp-registry
Trust Status
A
85/100Trusted
Listed in Forge index+10/10
Identity verified · attested build+20/20
Ed25519 publish signature+0/5
Included automatically when the publisher runs `forge publish`
Domain verification+0/5
Publisher: host /.well-known/forge.json on the package homepage with { "publisher": "<github-login>" }
npm Trusted Publishing (Sigstore)+5/5
npm maintainer match+0/5
Publisher: add the verified GitHub login to the npm package's maintainers (npm owner add <login>)
CVE scan · clean+30/30
Static analysis · clean+20/20
Paste into Claude Code, Cursor, or any AI assistant to fix all gaps
StatusIdentity verified
PublisherUnverified
SignatureUnsigned
Domain
Provenance✓ Sigstore-verified · bfeba78
Dependencies60 resolved+ · none vulnerable
Tool surface3 tools · none privileged
Security scan✓ Cleanv1.0.3 · 2mo ago
EvalsNone
IndexedJun 13, 2026

Verification confirms publisher identity (repo ownership), not code safety. The security scan covers known CVEs and suspicious install scripts — it cannot prove the absence of malicious code.

About

Stop putting API keys where AI agents can read them. Aegis is a local-first credential isolation proxy for AI agents. It sits between your agent and the APIs it calls — injecting secrets at the network boundary so the agent never sees, stores, or transmits real credentials. AI agents (Claude, GPT, Cursor, custom bots) increasingly call real APIs — Slack, GitHub, Stripe, databases. The current pattern is dangerous: 1. Agents see raw API keys — one prompt injection exfiltrates them 2. No domain…

Keywords
mcp