AI governance MCP server — policy enforcement, skills, memory, multi-LLM consensus
Author: Stephane Korning · 2026 · MIT + Commons Clause Version: v1.0.0 · May 2026 The governance layer for AI coding agents. Every agent action classified, gated, and cryptographically logged — regardless of which LLM or tool runs it. Your AI coding agents can write code. They can commit, push, delete, refactor. But who's watching them? Claude Code has no audit trail. Aider trusts the user. Codex…
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Author: Stephane Korning · 2026 · MIT + Commons Clause Version: v1.0.0 · May 2026 The governance layer for AI coding agents. Every agent action classified, gated, and cryptographically logged — regardless of which LLM or tool runs it. Your AI coding agents can write code. They can commit, push, delete, refactor. But who's watching them? Claude Code has no audit trail. Aider trusts the user. Codex sandboxes everything and hopes for the best. LangChain gives you building blocks but no guardrails.…
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