io.github.temurkhan13/openclaw-skill-vetter-mcp

MCPcommunity
v1.1.2io.github.temurkhan13UnknownUpdated 1mo agoGitHub

Vet third-party AI agent extensions + agent-config files (AGENTS.md, .cursor/rules, CLAUDE.md).

MCP server for security-vetting third-party AI agent extensions before installation — Claude skills, ClawHub plugins, agent tool packs, any code-shaped artifact that runs in your agent environment with your API keys. 41 detection rules across prompt-injection patterns, hardcoded exfiltration channels (Discord/Slack/Telegram webhooks, SSH-key reads, AWS-creds reads), dangerous dynamic execution (,…

Automatically indexed from public sources. Not yet verified by the developer on Forge.Claim this listing →
1mo agoLast update
Package
Authorio.github.temurkhan13
LicenseUnknown
Version1.1.2
Sourcemcp-registry
GitHubtemurkhan13/openclaw-skill-vetter-mcp
Trust Status
B
60/100Good
✓Listed in Forge index+10/10
—Publisher identity verified+0/25
→ Publisher: run `forge publish` from the package repo to claim ownership
—Ed25519 publish signature+0/10
→ Included automatically when the publisher runs `forge publish`
—Domain verification+0/5
→ Publisher: host /.well-known/forge.json on the package homepage with { "publisher": "<github-login>" }
✓CVE scan · clean+30/30
✓Static analysis · clean+20/20
—npm provenance (Sigstore)+0/5
→ Publish from GitHub Actions with the --provenance flag
Paste into Claude Code, Cursor, or any AI assistant to fix all gaps
StatusCommunity-indexed
PublisherUnverified
SignatureUnsigned
Domain—
Provenance—
DependenciesNot audited
Tool surface—
Security scan✓ Cleanv1.1.6 · 19d ago
EvalsNone
IndexedJun 13, 2026

Verification confirms publisher identity (repo ownership), not code safety. The security scan covers known CVEs and suspicious install scripts — it cannot prove the absence of malicious code.

About

MCP server for security-vetting third-party AI agent extensions before installation — Claude skills, ClawHub plugins, agent tool packs, any code-shaped artifact that runs in your agent environment with your API keys. 41 detection rules across prompt-injection patterns, hardcoded exfiltration channels (Discord/Slack/Telegram webhooks, SSH-key reads, AWS-creds reads), dangerous dynamic execution (, , , pickle.loads), manifest/permission drift, and known typosquat dependencies. Outputs a 0-100…

Keywords
mcp