Charter-bound defensive security copilot: secrets, obfuscation, deps, Dockerfile, IaC scans.
A transparent, constitution-bound defensive security copilot. Ships a CLI, an MCP server (Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Codex CLI/Desktop, Cursor, Continue, Zed), an optional cloud or local LLM advisor, an HTML report exporter, and an This project is the inverse of an obfuscated abuse toolkit: defensive only, inspectable by design, and bound by a charter the agent cannot rewrite. Three ideas guide…
Inferred from the transports this listing declares (stdio). A client not listed here hasn’t been ruled out — it just isn’t something Forge can confirm.
Verification confirms publisher identity (repo ownership), not code safety. The security scan covers known CVEs and suspicious install scripts.
Forge read 0 source files from the published package tarball and matched no MCP tool registrations. Extraction is pattern-based over shipped source: a server that builds its tool list at runtime, or that ships only bundled or minified code, registers nothing this can see. Treat it as “not detected”, not as “exposes none”.
A transparent, constitution-bound defensive security copilot. Ships a CLI, an MCP server (Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Codex CLI/Desktop, Cursor, Continue, Zed), an optional cloud or local LLM advisor, an HTML report exporter, and an This project is the inverse of an obfuscated abuse toolkit: defensive only, inspectable by design, and bound by a charter the agent cannot rewrite. Three ideas guide it: Project Glasswing (Anthropic) - defensive collaboration and shareable security artifacts. Aegis…
Forge's dependency resolver reads npm metadata only, so this PyPI package has no resolved tree. That is a gap in coverage, not a clean bill of health.