io.github.wundervault/wundervault-mcp

MCPcommunity
v1.6.7io.github.wundervaultUnknownUpdated 20d agonpmGitHub

Zero-knowledge secret vault for AI agents: secrets injected into commands, never seen by the model

MCP server for Wundervault zero-knowledge secret management. Exposes vault secrets to AI agents via the Model Context Protocol — secrets are decrypted server-side and never returned to the agent in plaintext. Or using a credentials file: Zero-knowledge: The encryption key lives only in the MCP server process. The Wundervault server never sees it. Burn-after-reading: Plaintext secrets are never…

Automatically indexed from public sources. Not yet verified by the developer on Forge.Claim this listing →
20d agoLast update
Package
Authorio.github.wundervault
LicenseUnknown
Version1.6.7
Sourcemcp-registry
npm@wundervault/mcp-server
GitHubwundervault/wundervault-mcp
Trust Status
B
60/100Good
✓Listed in Forge index+10/10
—Publisher identity verified+0/25
→ Publisher: run `forge publish` from the package repo to claim ownership
—Ed25519 publish signature+0/10
→ Included automatically when the publisher runs `forge publish`
—Domain verification+0/5
→ Publisher: host /.well-known/forge.json on the package homepage with { "publisher": "<github-login>" }
✓CVE scan · clean+30/30
✓Static analysis · clean+20/20
—npm provenance (Sigstore)+0/5
→ Publish from GitHub Actions with the --provenance flag
Paste into Claude Code, Cursor, or any AI assistant to fix all gaps
StatusCommunity-indexed
PublisherUnverified
SignatureUnsigned
Domain—
Provenance—
Dependencies✓ 60 resolved+ · none vulnerable
Tool surface6 tools · 1 privileged
Security scan✓ Cleanv1.6.7 · 20d ago
EvalsNone
IndexedJun 13, 2026

Verification confirms publisher identity (repo ownership), not code safety. The security scan covers known CVEs and suspicious install scripts — it cannot prove the absence of malicious code.

About

MCP server for Wundervault zero-knowledge secret management. Exposes vault secrets to AI agents via the Model Context Protocol — secrets are decrypted server-side and never returned to the agent in plaintext. Or using a credentials file: Zero-knowledge: The encryption key lives only in the MCP server process. The Wundervault server never sees it. Burn-after-reading: Plaintext secrets are never returned to the calling agent. After decryption, the agent receives only . Exec scrubbing: If you use…

Keywords
mcp