MCP server interface for AI agent and MCP security auditing — config analysis, trust audits, prompt injection testing, tool probing, and data flow tracing
Inferred from the transports this listing declares (stdio). A client not listed here hasn’t been ruled out — it just isn’t something Forge can confirm.
AGENT_SECURITY_API_KEYAPI keyrequiredAPI key for the managed hosted audit backend
Declared by the author in the official MCP registry. Forge does not store, broker, or ever see these values — the config below is scaffolded with placeholders you fill in locally.
Verification confirms publisher identity (repo ownership), not code safety. The security scan covers known CVEs and suspicious install scripts.
Read out of the source npm actually ships, at scan time. The package was never executed. Tools registered dynamically at runtime, or hidden inside bundled or minified code, can be missed — so this is a floor on the tool surface, not a complete census of it.
audit_mcp_configPerform static analysis on raw MCP config JSON and identify privilege, auth, transport, and launch risks.Perform static analysis on raw MCP config JSON and identify privilege, auth, transport, and launch risks.
No input schema was published for this tool.
audit_mcp_serverLaunch a target MCP server over stdio, enumerate tools, and run active security probes against its exposed tools. Requires AGENT_SECURITY_ADMIN_MODE=1.Launch a target MCP server over stdio, enumerate tools, and run active security probes against its exposed tools. Requires AGENT_SECURITY_ADMIN_MODE=1.
No input schema was published for this tool.
audit_agent_trustAudit an MCP or agent deployment for tool-permission inventory, execution provenance coverage, secret exposure controls, policy drift, and an overall trust score.Audit an MCP or agent deployment for tool-permission inventory, execution provenance coverage, secret exposure controls, policy drift, and an overall trust score.
No input schema was published for this tool.
audit_prompt_injectionPerform a static prompt-hardening review against a 30+ payload prompt-injection catalog.Perform a static prompt-hardening review against a 30+ payload prompt-injection catalog.
No input schema was published for this tool.
audit_agent_dataflowInfer tagged-data exposure and exfiltration paths from MCP config and observed tool capabilities.Infer tagged-data exposure and exfiltration paths from MCP config and observed tool capabilities.
No input schema was published for this tool.
scan_mcp_packageScan an npm MCP package for dependency vulnerabilities, dangerous patterns, and permission issues.Scan an npm MCP package for dependency vulnerabilities, dangerous patterns, and permission issues.
No input schema was published for this tool.
generate_reportCombine multiple stored audit jobs into a composite report with deduplicated findings and an executive summary.Combine multiple stored audit jobs into a composite report with deduplicated findings and an executive summary.
No input schema was published for this tool.
fix_mcp_configAuto-remediate security issues in an MCP config: remove unsafe flags, strip shell wrappers, upgrade transport to TLS, redact inline secrets, add auth placeholders, and constrain filesystem scope.Auto-remediate security issues in an MCP config: remove unsafe flags, strip shell wrappers, upgrade transport to TLS, redact inline secrets, add auth placeholders, and constrain filesystem scope.
No input schema was published for this tool.
harden_system_promptAnalyze a system prompt for injection vulnerabilities and return a hardened version with security guardrails appended.Analyze a system prompt for injection vulnerabilities and return a hardened version with security guardrails appended.
Analyze a system prompt for injection vulnerabilities and return a hardenNo input schema was published for this tool.
generate_policyGenerate a JSON security policy from an MCP config that can be enforced by a proxy or middleware.Generate a JSON security policy from an MCP config that can be enforced by a proxy or middleware.
No input schema was published for this tool.
10 of 10 tools published a description.
Tool names and descriptions are written by the publisher and shown verbatim as inert text. They are the strings an MCP client passes to a model, so Forge scans them for prompt-injection patterns — any finding appears with the security scan above. “Privileged” is a keyword match on the tool name, not an audit of what the tool does: a benign-sounding name can still do anything.
MCP server interface for AI agent and MCP security auditing — config analysis, trust audits, prompt injection testing, tool probing, and data flow tracing
Linked names open Forge’s index of every entry observed exposing that tool. Browse all indexed tools.
The crawl stopped at the depth-4 limit. Anything below that level was never resolved.
The crawl stopped at the 60-package limit. The rest of the tree was never resolved.
36 more resolved packages are not drawn here (display cap: 24). Every dependency carrying an advisory is drawn regardless of the cap. Full inventory (CycloneDX SBOM)
53 declared dependencies never landed in the tree. They are missing from Forge's resolution, not from the package.
+41 more not listed. The counts by reason above cover all of them.
Not followed: peerDependencies. This tree covers runtime dependencies only, so anything those pull in was never resolved.