legion-mcp

MCPattested
v0.4.1io.github.faulkjKopimiUpdated 17d agonpmGitHub

MCP-native LLM councils for debates, juries, blind panels, refinement, and custom deliberation.

Works in
ClaudeCursorCopilotGemini

Inferred from the transports this listing declares (stdio). A client not listed here hasn’t been ruled out — it just isn’t something Forge can confirm.

Attested build
A verified provenance attestation binds this artifact to the listed repository. Nobody has claimed the listing yet — this proves where the code was built, not who stands behind it.
16Downloads/wk
17d agoLast update
Reads these credentials
  • DEFAULT_API_KEYAPI keyoptional

    Default provider or gateway key for model files that omit apiKey.

Declared by the author in the official MCP registry. Forge does not store, broker, or ever see these values — the config below is scaffolded with placeholders you fill in locally.

Package
Authorio.github.faulkj
LicenseKopimi
Version0.4.1
Sourcenpm+mcp-registry
npmlegion-mcp
GitHubfaulkj/legion-mcp
SBOMCycloneDX 1.6 ↓
Trust Status
A
85/100Trusted
✓Listed in Forge index+10/10
✓Identity verified · attested build+20/20
—Ed25519 publish signature+0/5
→ Included automatically when the publisher runs `forge publish`
—Domain verification+0/5
→ Publisher: host /.well-known/forge.json on the package homepage with { "publisher": "<github-login>" }
✓npm Trusted Publishing (Sigstore)+5/5
—npm maintainer match+0/5
→ Publisher: add the verified GitHub login to the npm package's maintainers (npm owner add <login>)
✓CVE scan · clean+30/30
✓Static analysis · clean+20/20
Paste into Claude Code, Cursor, or any AI assistant to fix all gaps
StatusIdentity verified
PublisherUnverified
SignatureUnsigned
Domain—
Provenance✓ Sigstore-verified · 43aaff3
Dependencies✓ 10 resolved · none vulnerable
Tool surface1 tool · none privileged
Security scan✓ Cleanv0.4.1 · 13d agoHow well does this scan work?
EvalsNone
IndexedAug 26, 2026

Verification confirms publisher identity (repo ownership), not code safety. The security scan covers known CVEs and suspicious install scripts.

Tools

1 tool · none privileged
Statically extracted from the published packagev0.4.1 · 13d ago

Read out of the source npm actually ships, at scan time. The package was never executed. Tools registered dynamically at runtime, or hidden inside bundled or minified code, can be missed — so this is a floor on the tool surface, not a complete census of it.

quorumNo description published

This tool published no description. Forge does not invent one.

0 of 1 tools published a description.

Tool names and descriptions are written by the publisher and shown verbatim as inert text. They are the strings an MCP client passes to a model, so Forge scans them for prompt-injection patterns — any finding appears with the security scan above. “Privileged” is a keyword match on the tool name, not an audit of what the tool does: a benign-sounding name can still do anything.

About

MCP-native LLM councils for debates, juries, blind panels, refinement, and custom deliberation.

Keywords
mcp
Alternatives
Comparing tool surfaces…

Tools exposed

1 tool · none privileged · observed by static extraction. A tool surface is what one scan read on one day, not a live capability list.

Linked names open Forge’s index of every entry observed exposing that tool. Browse all indexed tools.

Dependency tree

What one Forge scan resolved from npm metadata on 2026-09-01 — observed resolution, not a publisher declaration.

10 packages resolved · 5 direct · none carrying advisories Resolution stops at depth 4 and 60 packages.

Not followed: peerDependencies. This tree covers runtime dependencies only, so anything those pull in was never resolved.