Governance proxy for MCP servers: allowlist, forced dry run, human confirmation, blast radius, audit
Inferred from the transports this listing declares (stdio). A client not listed here hasn’t been ruled out — it just isn’t something Forge can confirm.
AIRLOCK_JWT_SECRETAPI keyoptionalHS256 secret for verifying bearer tokens (or set AIRLOCK_JWKS_URL for OIDC)
AIRLOCK_SECRETAPI keyoptionalKey for signing confirmation tokens; set it when running more than one replica
Declared by the author in the official MCP registry. Forge does not store, broker, or ever see these values — the config below is scaffolded with placeholders you fill in locally.
Verification confirms publisher identity (repo ownership), not code safety. The security scan covers known CVEs and suspicious install scripts.
Forge read 9 source files from the published package tarball and matched no MCP tool registrations. Extraction is pattern-based over shipped source: a server that builds its tool list at runtime, or that ships only bundled or minified code, registers nothing this can see. Treat it as “not detected”, not as “exposes none”.
Governance proxy for MCP servers: allowlist, forced dry run, human confirmation, blast radius, audit
Forge's dependency resolver reads npm metadata only, so this PyPI package has no resolved tree. That is a gap in coverage, not a clean bill of health.