mxprobe

MCPattested
v0.2.6dev.mxprobeMITUpdated 10d agonpmGitHub

Email verification for AI agents: send, hold or kill with the reason. Signup and credits by API.

Works in
ClaudeCursorCopilotGemini

Inferred from the transports this listing declares (stdio). A client not listed here hasn’t been ruled out — it just isn’t something Forge can confirm.

Attested build
A verified provenance attestation binds this artifact to the listed repository. Nobody has claimed the listing yet — this proves where the code was built, not who stands behind it.
595Downloads/wk
2GitHub stars
10d agoLast update
Reads these credentials
  • MXPROBE_API_KEYAPI keyoptional

    Hosted-tier API key from POST /v1/signup or the signup tool. Without it the verify tools run the free local DNS tier.

Declared by the author in the official MCP registry. Forge does not store, broker, or ever see these values — the config below is scaffolded with placeholders you fill in locally.

Package
Authordev.mxprobe
LicenseMIT
Version0.2.6
Sourcenpm+mcp-registry
Trust Status
A
85/100Trusted
✓Listed in Forge index+10/10
✓Identity verified · attested build+20/20
—Ed25519 publish signature+0/5
→ Included automatically when the publisher runs `forge publish`
—Domain verification+0/5
→ Publisher: host /.well-known/forge.json on the package homepage with { "publisher": "<github-login>" }
✓npm Trusted Publishing (Sigstore)+5/5
—npm maintainer match+0/5
→ Publisher: add the verified GitHub login to the npm package's maintainers (npm owner add <login>)
✓CVE scan · clean+30/30
✓Static analysis · clean+20/20
Paste into Claude Code, Cursor, or any AI assistant to fix all gaps
StatusIdentity verified
PublisherUnverified
SignatureUnsigned
Domain—
Provenance✓ Sigstore-verified · a8dd36b
Dependencies✓ 60 resolved+ · none vulnerable
Tool surface5 tools · none privileged
Security scan✓ Cleanv0.2.4 · 19d agoHow well does this scan work?
EvalsNone
IndexedSep 14, 2026

Verification confirms publisher identity (repo ownership), not code safety. The security scan covers known CVEs and suspicious install scripts.

Tools

5 tools · none privileged
Statically extracted from the published packagev0.2.4 · 19d ago

Read out of the source npm actually ships, at scan time. The package was never executed. Tools registered dynamically at runtime, or hidden inside bundled or minified code, can be missed — so this is a floor on the tool surface, not a complete census of it.

verify_emailNo description published

This tool published no description. Forge does not invent one.

verify_batchNo description published

This tool published no description. Forge does not invent one.

signupSign up with an email address. Returns an API key with 100 free checks and saves it locally for the other tools. The key is also mailed to the address. One key per address.

Sign up with an email address. Returns an API key with 100 free checks and saves it locally for the other tools. The key is also mailed to the address. One key per address.

No input schema was published for this tool.

balanceHow many hosted checks are left on the configured API key.

How many hosted checks are left on the configured API key.

No input schema was published for this tool.

buy_creditsGet a Stripe Checkout link for more hosted checks: 9 USD per 10,000, one payment, credits never expire. Open the link to pay; credits land on the key when Stripe confirms.

Get a Stripe Checkout link for more hosted checks: 9 USD per 10,000, one payment, credits never expire. Open the link to pay; credits land on the key when Stripe confirms.

No input schema was published for this tool.

3 of 5 tools published a description.

Tool names and descriptions are written by the publisher and shown verbatim as inert text. They are the strings an MCP client passes to a model, so Forge scans them for prompt-injection patterns — any finding appears with the security scan above. “Privileged” is a keyword match on the tool name, not an audit of what the tool does: a benign-sounding name can still do anything.

About

Email verification for AI agents: send, hold or kill with the reason. Signup and credits by API.

Keywords
mcp
Alternatives
Comparing tool surfaces…

Dependency tree

What one Forge scan resolved from npm metadata on 2026-09-14 — observed resolution, not a publisher declaration.

60 packages resolved · 3 direct · none carrying advisories Resolution stops at depth 4 and 60 packages.

The crawl stopped at the depth-4 limit. Anything below that level was never resolved.

The crawl stopped at the 60-package limit. The rest of the tree was never resolved.

36 more resolved packages are not drawn here (display cap: 24). Every dependency carrying an advisory is drawn regardless of the cap. Full inventory (CycloneDX SBOM)

Declared but not resolved

54 declared dependencies never landed in the tree. They are missing from Forge's resolution, not from the package.

+42 more not listed. The counts by reason above cover all of them.

Not followed: peerDependencies. This tree covers runtime dependencies only, so anything those pull in was never resolved.