Human-in-the-loop approval for agent actions, with verifiable action-bound receipts.
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https://glyt.net/mcp6 tools · 1283msdiscoveryGlyt service discovery: issuer did:key, receipt schema version, and how to verify receipts offline.Glyt service discovery: issuer did:key, receipt schema version, and how to verify receipts offline.
No input schema was published for this tool.
verify_receiptVerify a Glyt receipt against the exact action you are about to run. Returns {valid, decision, acr, not_after, reasons}. The authoritative check is offline against the issuer did:key; this is a convenience.Verify a Glyt receipt against the exact action you are about to run. Returns {valid, decision, acr, not_after, reasons}. The authoritative check is offline against the issuer did:key; this is a convenience.
| Parameter | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| action* | object | — |
| receipt* | — | The receipt envelope object or its JSON string. |
| required_acr | string | — |
| expected_agent_sub | string | — |
get_receiptFetch a signed receipt envelope by id.Fetch a signed receipt envelope by id.
| Parameter | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| receipt_id* | string | — |
request_approvalAsk the operator behind this agent to approve a specific action. Requires a Colony token-exchange id_token (colony:operator) as `id_token`. Returns the request view; poll with check_approval. Nothing is approved without the human's decision.Ask the operator behind this agent to approve a specific action. Requires a Colony token-exchange id_token (colony:operator) as `id_token`. Returns the request view; poll with check_approval. Nothing is approved without the human's decision.
| Parameter | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| id_token* | string | A Colony token-exchange id_token audienced to Glyt. |
| action* | object | — |
| stake_tier | string | — |
| summary | string | — |
| callback_url | string | — |
check_approvalPoll one of your approval requests. Requires the same `id_token`. Returns the request view, including the signed receipt once decided.Poll one of your approval requests. Requires the same `id_token`. Returns the request view, including the signed receipt once decided.
| Parameter | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| id_token* | string | — |
| request_id* | string | — |
file_contestAs the SUBJECT of an approval, file a Bitcoin-anchored, self-signed objection into that receipt's declared contest channel (the §12.3 upper bound). You sign the contest with your OWN ed25519 key and supply your OWN Touchstone-audience id_token — Glyt writes it AS you, holding no secret. Sign JCS{v:…As the SUBJECT of an approval, file a Bitcoin-anchored, self-signed objection into that receipt's declared contest channel (the §12.3 upper bound). You sign the contest with your OWN ed25519 key and supply your OWN Touchstone-audience id_token — Glyt writes it AS you, holding no secret. Sign JCS{v:…
| Parameter | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| id_token* | string | Your Glyt-audience Colony id_token (authenticates you as the subject). |
| receipt_id* | string | — |
| touchstone_id_token* | string | Your Touchstone-audience Colony id_token (authenticates the contest write as you). |
| contestant_pubkey* | string | Your ed25519 public key, standard base64. |
| contestant_sig* | string | Your signature over the contest signed_content, standard base64. |
| reason* | string | — |
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Human-in-the-loop approval for agent actions, with verifiable action-bound receipts.
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