Should this payment go to this address? MCP server for pre-settlement payment compliance: screen a payee address for OFAC sanctions, mixers, scam and hack lists and on-chain risk across 7 EVM chains, Tron and Solana — with click-through evidence, not a bl
Inferred from the transports this listing declares (stdio, streamable-http). A client not listed here hasn’t been ruled out — it just isn’t something Forge can confirm.
Verification confirms publisher identity (repo ownership), not code safety. The security scan covers known CVEs and suspicious install scripts.
Read out of the source npm actually ships, at scan time. The package was never executed. Tools registered dynamically at runtime, or hidden inside bundled or minified code, can be missed — so this is a floor on the tool surface, not a complete census of it.
screen_addressNo description publishedThis tool published no description. Forge does not invent one.
payee_decideNo description publishedThis tool published no description. Forge does not invent one.
counterparty_control_baselineNo description publishedThis tool published no description. Forge does not invent one.
resolve_agent_identityNo description publishedThis tool published no description. Forge does not invent one.
recent_flaggedReturn a representative sample of addresses on OceanAlt's reviewed risk list — OFAC-sanctioned, known mixers, and community-reported scam/phishing — each with its source category and the reason it was flagged. Useful for grounding, showing an agent/user what gets blocked and why, or a quick read on…Return a representative sample of addresses on OceanAlt's reviewed risk list — OFAC-sanctioned, known mixers, and community-reported scam/phishing — each with its source category and the reason it was flagged. Useful for grounding, showing an agent/user what gets blocked and why, or a quick read on…
No input schema was published for this tool.
payment_decisionNo description publishedThis tool published no description. Forge does not invent one.
compliance_decisionNo description publishedThis tool published no description. Forge does not invent one.
deep_traceNo description publishedThis tool published no description. Forge does not invent one.
batch_screenNo description publishedThis tool published no description. Forge does not invent one.
1 of 9 tools published a description.
Tool names and descriptions are written by the publisher and shown verbatim as inert text. They are the strings an MCP client passes to a model, so Forge scans them for prompt-injection patterns — any finding appears with the security scan above. “Privileged” is a keyword match on the tool name, not an audit of what the tool does: a benign-sounding name can still do anything.
Should this payment go to this address? MCP server for pre-settlement payment compliance: screen a payee address for OFAC sanctions, mixers, scam and hack lists and on-chain risk across 7 EVM chains, Tron and Solana — with click-through evidence, not a bl
Linked names open Forge’s index of every entry observed exposing that tool. Browse all indexed tools.
The crawl stopped at the depth-4 limit. Anything below that level was never resolved.
The crawl stopped at the 60-package limit. The rest of the tree was never resolved.
36 more resolved packages are not drawn here (display cap: 24). Every dependency carrying an advisory is drawn regardless of the cap. Full inventory (CycloneDX SBOM)
54 declared dependencies never landed in the tree. They are missing from Forge's resolution, not from the package.
+42 more not listed. The counts by reason above cover all of them.
Not followed: peerDependencies. This tree covers runtime dependencies only, so anything those pull in was never resolved.