sbor-mcp

MCPcommunitylive

v1.2.0xyz.sborMITUpdated 9d agonpm GitHub

Check a lending rate before your agent borrows. Stacks benchmark, read from contract state. No key.

Endpoint healthlive

checked 8 days ago · 150ms

100% of the last 1 check reached this endpoint

Works in

ClaudeCursorCopilotChatGPTGemini

Inferred from the transports this listing declares (stdio, streamable-http). A client not listed here hasn’t been ruled out — it just isn’t something Forge can confirm.

Automatically indexed from public sources. Not yet verified by the developer on Forge.Claim this listing →

698Downloads/wk

9d agoLast update

Package

Authorxyz.sbor

LicenseMIT

Version1.2.0

Sourcenpm+mcp-registry

GitHubsborxyz/sbor

SBOMCycloneDX 1.6 ↓

Trust Status

B

60/100Good

✓Listed in Forge index+10/10

—Publisher identity verified+0/20

→ Publisher: run `forge publish` from the package repo to claim ownership

—Ed25519 publish signature+0/5

→ Included automatically when the publisher runs `forge publish`

—Domain verification+0/5

→ Publisher: host /.well-known/forge.json on the package homepage with { "publisher": "<github-login>" }

—npm Trusted Publishing (Sigstore)+0/5

→ Publish from GitHub Actions with --provenance so the attestation binds this package to this repo

—npm maintainer match+0/5

→ Earned once your identity is verified above and that login is an npm maintainer of this package

✓CVE scan · clean+30/30

✓Static analysis · clean+20/20

Paste into Claude Code, Cursor, or any AI assistant to fix all gaps

StatusCommunity-indexed

PublisherUnverified

SignatureUnsigned

Domain—

Provenance—

Dependencies✓ 60 resolved+ · none vulnerable

Tool surface6 tools · none privileged

Security scan✓ Cleanv1.2.0 · 8d agoHow well does this scan work?

EvalsNone

IndexedSep 24, 2026

Verification confirms publisher identity (repo ownership), not code safety. The security scan covers known CVEs and suspicious install scripts.

Tools

6 tools · none privileged

Statically extracted from the published packagev1.2.0 · 8d ago

Read out of the source npm actually ships, at scan time. The package was never executed. Tools registered dynamically at runtime, or hidden inside bundled or minified code, can be missed — so this is a floor on the tool surface, not a complete census of it.

get_rateThe benchmark borrow and supply rate for lending on Stacks, read from

The benchmark borrow and supply rate for lending on Stacks, read from

No input schema was published for this tool.

compare_rateGiven a rate you have been offered, say whether it is above or below the

Given a rate you have been offered, say whether it is above or below the

No input schema was published for this tool.

list_marketsEvery venue and asset in an index, with its borrow rate, supply rate,

Every venue and asset in an index, with its borrow rate, supply rate,

No input schema was published for this tool.

get_historyDaily fixings since the index began. Use this to see whether a rate is

Daily fixings since the index began. Use this to see whether a rate is

No input schema was published for this tool.

compare_chainsThe same asset classes on the largest lending markets on Ethereum, Base,

The same asset classes on the largest lending markets on Ethereum, Base,

No input schema was published for this tool.

get_methodologyThe full methodology and integration policy: how the fixing is built,

The full methodology and integration policy: how the fixing is built,

No input schema was published for this tool.

6 of 6 tools published a description.

Tool names and descriptions are written by the publisher and shown verbatim as inert text. They are the strings an MCP client passes to a model, so Forge scans them for prompt-injection patterns — any finding appears with the security scan above. “Privileged” is a keyword match on the tool name, not an audit of what the tool does: a benign-sounding name can still do anything.

About

Check a lending rate before your agent borrows. Stacks benchmark, read from contract state. No key.

Keywords

mcp

Alternatives

Comparing tool surfaces…

Tools exposed

6 tools · none privileged · observed 2026-09-26 by static extraction. A tool surface is what one scan read on one day, not a live capability list.

get_rate
compare_rate
list_markets
get_history
compare_chains
get_methodology

Linked names open Forge’s index of every entry observed exposing that tool. Browse all indexed tools.

Dependency tree

What one Forge scan resolved from npm metadata on 2026-09-26 — observed resolution, not a publisher declaration.

60 packages resolved · 2 direct · none carrying advisories Resolution stops at depth 4 and 60 packages.

zod3.25.76
@modelcontextprotocol/sdk1.30.117 dependencies
- ajv8.20.04 dependencies
  - fast-deep-equal3.1.3
  - fast-uri3.1.8
  - json-schema-traverse1.0.0
  - require-from-string2.0.2
- zod4.6.5
- cors2.8.6+1 not drawn1 dependency
  - object-assign4.1.1
- hono4.13.9
- jose6.2.12
- express5.2.1+27 not drawn1 dependency
  - content-type1.0.5
- raw-body3.0.2+4 not drawn
- ajv-formats3.0.11 dependency
  - ajv8.20.0shown above
- cross-spawn7.0.6+3 not drawn
- eventsource3.0.71 dependency
  - eventsource-parser3.1.1
- content-type1.0.5shown above
- pkce-challenge5.0.1
- @hono/node-server2.1.1
- json-schema-typed8.0.2
- eventsource-parser3.1.1shown above
- express-rate-limit8.7.0+2 not drawn
- zod-to-json-schema3.25.2

The crawl stopped at the depth-4 limit. Anything below that level was never resolved.

The crawl stopped at the 60-package limit. The rest of the tree was never resolved.

36 more resolved packages are not drawn here (display cap: 24). Every dependency carrying an advisory is drawn regardless of the cap. Full inventory (CycloneDX SBOM)

Declared but not resolved

54 declared dependencies never landed in the tree. They are missing from Forge's resolution, not from the package.

package cap reached: 49
below the depth cap: 5

wrappy 1 — required by once@1.4.0package cap reached
http-errors ^2.0.1 — required by send@1.2.1package cap reached
mime-types ^3.0.2 — required by send@1.2.1package cap reached
ms ^2.1.3 — required by send@1.2.1package cap reached
on-finished ^2.4.1 — required by send@1.2.1package cap reached
range-parser ^1.2.1 — required by send@1.2.1package cap reached
statuses ^2.0.2 — required by send@1.2.1package cap reached
ms ^2.1.3 — required by debug@4.4.3package cap reached
debug ^4.4.0 — required by router@2.2.0package cap reached
depd ^2.0.0 — required by router@2.2.0package cap reached
is-promise ^4.0.0 — required by router@2.2.0package cap reached
parseurl ^1.3.3 — required by router@2.2.0package cap reached

+42 more not listed. The counts by reason above cover all of them.

Not followed: peerDependencies. This tree covers runtime dependencies only, so anything those pull in was never resolved.