siglio-mcp

MCPcommunity
v1.0.4UnknownMITUpdated 1d agonpm

MCP server for Siglio. Lets an AI assistant send documents for e-signature by email or text.

Works in
ClaudeCursorCopilotGemini

Inferred from the transports this listing declares (stdio). A client not listed here hasn’t been ruled out — it just isn’t something Forge can confirm.

Automatically indexed from public sources. Not yet verified by the developer on Forge.Claim this listing →
119Downloads/wk
1d agoLast update
Needs 1 credential before it runs
  • SIGLIO_API_KEYAPI keyrequired

    Your Siglio API key. Sandbox keys start with sig_sandbox_ and live keys start with sig_live_. Get one at https://esigndev.com

Declared by the author in the official MCP registry. Forge does not store, broker, or ever see these values — the config below is scaffolded with placeholders you fill in locally.

Package
AuthorUnknown
LicenseMIT
Version1.0.4
Sourcenpm+mcp-registry
npmsiglio-mcp
SBOMCycloneDX 1.6 ↓
Trust Status
B
60/100Good
✓Listed in Forge index+10/10
—Publisher identity verified+0/20
→ Publisher: run `forge publish` from the package repo to claim ownership
—Ed25519 publish signature+0/5
→ Included automatically when the publisher runs `forge publish`
—Domain verification+0/5
→ Publisher: host /.well-known/forge.json on the package homepage with { "publisher": "<github-login>" }
—npm Trusted Publishing (Sigstore)+0/5
→ Publish from GitHub Actions with --provenance so the attestation binds this package to this repo
—npm maintainer match+0/5
→ Earned once your identity is verified above and that login is an npm maintainer of this package
✓CVE scan · clean+30/30
✓Static analysis · clean+20/20
Paste into Claude Code, Cursor, or any AI assistant to fix all gaps
StatusCommunity-indexed
PublisherUnverified
SignatureUnsigned
Domain—
Provenance—
Dependencies✓ 60 resolved+ · none vulnerable
Tool surface4 tools · none privileged
Security scan✓ Cleanv1.0.3 · 1d agoHow well does this scan work?
EvalsNone
IndexedSep 14, 2026

Verification confirms publisher identity (repo ownership), not code safety. The security scan covers known CVEs and suspicious install scripts.

Tools

4 tools · none privileged
Statically extracted from the published packagev1.0.3 · 1d ago

Read out of the source npm actually ships, at scan time. The package was never executed. Tools registered dynamically at runtime, or hidden inside bundled or minified code, can be missed — so this is a floor on the tool surface, not a complete census of it.

send_for_signatureSends a PDF to one or two people for electronic signature, by email, text message, or both at once.

Sends a PDF to one or two people for electronic signature, by email, text message, or both at once.

No input schema was published for this tool.

check_envelopeReturns the current state of an envelope: whether it was delivered, opened, signed, or cancelled,

Returns the current state of an envelope: whether it was delivered, opened, signed, or cancelled,

No input schema was published for this tool.

download_signed_documentSaves the completed, signed PDF to this machine. Only works once every signature is in; an envelope

Saves the completed, signed PDF to this machine. Only works once every signature is in; an envelope

No input schema was published for this tool.

void_envelopeCancels an envelope that has not been signed yet. The signing link stops working immediately and the

Cancels an envelope that has not been signed yet. The signing link stops working immediately and the

No input schema was published for this tool.

4 of 4 tools published a description.

Tool names and descriptions are written by the publisher and shown verbatim as inert text. They are the strings an MCP client passes to a model, so Forge scans them for prompt-injection patterns — any finding appears with the security scan above. “Privileged” is a keyword match on the tool name, not an audit of what the tool does: a benign-sounding name can still do anything.

About

MCP server for Siglio. Lets an AI assistant send documents for e-signature by email or text.

Keywords
mcpmodelcontextprotocolesignaturesigliosignaturepdf
Alternatives
Comparing tool surfaces…

Tools exposed

4 tools · none privileged · observed by static extraction. A tool surface is what one scan read on one day, not a live capability list.

Linked names open Forge’s index of every entry observed exposing that tool. Browse all indexed tools.

Dependency tree

What one Forge scan resolved from npm metadata on 2026-09-14 — observed resolution, not a publisher declaration.

60 packages resolved · 2 direct · none carrying advisories Resolution stops at depth 4 and 60 packages.

The crawl stopped at the depth-4 limit. Anything below that level was never resolved.

The crawl stopped at the 60-package limit. The rest of the tree was never resolved.

36 more resolved packages are not drawn here (display cap: 24). Every dependency carrying an advisory is drawn regardless of the cap. Full inventory (CycloneDX SBOM)

Declared but not resolved

54 declared dependencies never landed in the tree. They are missing from Forge's resolution, not from the package.

+42 more not listed. The counts by reason above cover all of them.

Not followed: peerDependencies. This tree covers runtime dependencies only, so anything those pull in was never resolved.

Topics

Related in documents & pdfs