tradingagentstack-mcp

MCPcommunitylive
v0.3.2io.github.intoApexMITUpdated 4d agonpmGitHub

Read-only MCP server for the TradingAgentStack directory: search AI trading tools, broker MCP servers and APIs, compare them, and see who places the order. Every answer carries sources and last-checked dates.

Endpoint healthlive
checked 7 days ago · 150ms
100% of the last 1 check reached this endpoint
Works in
ClaudeCursorCopilotChatGPTGemini

Inferred from the transports this listing declares (stdio, streamable-http). A client not listed here hasn’t been ruled out — it just isn’t something Forge can confirm.

Automatically indexed from public sources. Not yet verified by the developer on Forge.Claim this listing →
618Downloads/wk
4d agoLast update
Package
Authorio.github.intoApex
LicenseMIT
Version0.3.2
Sourcenpm+mcp-registry
Trust Status
B
60/100Good
✓Listed in Forge index+10/10
—Publisher identity verified+0/20
→ Publisher: run `forge publish` from the package repo to claim ownership
—Ed25519 publish signature+0/5
→ Included automatically when the publisher runs `forge publish`
—Domain verification+0/5
→ Publisher: host /.well-known/forge.json on the package homepage with { "publisher": "<github-login>" }
—npm Trusted Publishing (Sigstore)+0/5
→ Publish from GitHub Actions with --provenance so the attestation binds this package to this repo
—npm maintainer match+0/5
→ Earned once your identity is verified above and that login is an npm maintainer of this package
✓CVE scan · clean+30/30
✓Static analysis · clean+20/20
Paste into Claude Code, Cursor, or any AI assistant to fix all gaps
StatusCommunity-indexed
PublisherUnverified
SignatureUnsigned
Domain—
Provenance—
Dependencies✓ 60 resolved+ · none vulnerable
Tool surface8 tools · none privileged
Security scan✓ Cleanv0.5.0 · todayHow well does this scan work?
EvalsNone
IndexedOct 18, 2026

Verification confirms publisher identity (repo ownership), not code safety. The security scan covers known CVEs and suspicious install scripts.

Tools

8 tools · none privileged
Statically extracted from the published packagev0.5.0 · 12h ago

Read out of the source npm actually ships, at scan time. The package was never executed. Tools registered dynamically at runtime, or hidden inside bundled or minified code, can be missed — so this is a floor on the tool surface, not a complete census of it.

search_toolsSearch the TradingAgentStack directory of AI trading tools (broker MCP servers, trading and data APIs, bots, frameworks) by name, market or feature. Optional filters: category slug, can_trade_live, has_paper.

Search the TradingAgentStack directory of AI trading tools (broker MCP servers, trading and data APIs, bots, frameworks) by name, market or feature. Optional filters: category slug, can_trade_live, has_paper.

No input schema was published for this tool.

get_toolFull facts for one tool: pricing, live vs paper, order approval, rate limits, safety score inputs and every source URL.

Full facts for one tool: pricing, live vs paper, order approval, rate limits, safety score inputs and every source URL.

No input schema was published for this tool.

list_categoryList every tool in a category. Call with an unknown category to get the list of categories.

List every tool in a category. Call with an unknown category to get the list of categories.

No input schema was published for this tool.

compare_toolsCompare two tools side by side, field by field, with sources.

Compare two tools side by side, field by field, with sources.

No input schema was published for this tool.

broker_order_gatingWho places the order for every official broker MCP server: AI trades directly, you confirm each order, approval optional, or you place the order.

Who places the order for every official broker MCP server: AI trades directly, you confirm each order, approval optional, or you place the order.

No input schema was published for this tool.

get_riskCheck a tool before your agent connects to it: how much money could the agent lose if it is wrong, hacked or prompt-injected? Returns the Agent Risk Score (custody, limits enforced outside the model, human approval, withdrawal scope, preview, open source, incident record), each input with its offic…

Check a tool before your agent connects to it: how much money could the agent lose if it is wrong, hacked or prompt-injected? Returns the Agent Risk Score (custody, limits enforced outside the model, human approval, withdrawal scope, preview, open source, incident record), each input with its offic…

No input schema was published for this tool.

get_incidentsSecurity incidents involving AI agents, trading tools and the infrastructure they run on (breaches, exploits, security releases), each from an official disclosure. Filter by date or by a listed tool.

Security incidents involving AI agents, trading tools and the infrastructure they run on (breaches, exploits, security releases), each from an official disclosure. Filter by date or by a listed tool.

No input schema was published for this tool.

checkNo description published

This tool published no description. Forge does not invent one.

7 of 8 tools published a description.

Tool names and descriptions are written by the publisher and shown verbatim as inert text. They are the strings an MCP client passes to a model, so Forge scans them for prompt-injection patterns — any finding appears with the security scan above. “Privileged” is a keyword match on the tool name, not an audit of what the tool does: a benign-sounding name can still do anything.

About

Read-only MCP server for the TradingAgentStack directory: search AI trading tools, broker MCP servers and APIs, compare them, and see who places the order. Every answer carries sources and last-checked dates.

Keywords
mcpmodel-context-protocoltradingbrokerai-agentsmarket-data
Alternatives
Comparing tool surfaces…

Dependency tree

What one Forge scan resolved from npm metadata on 2026-10-25 — observed resolution, not a publisher declaration.

60 packages resolved · 1 direct · none carrying advisories Resolution stops at depth 4 and 60 packages.

The crawl stopped at the depth-4 limit. Anything below that level was never resolved.

The crawl stopped at the 60-package limit. The rest of the tree was never resolved.

36 more resolved packages are not drawn here (display cap: 24). Every dependency carrying an advisory is drawn regardless of the cap. Full inventory (CycloneDX SBOM)

Declared but not resolved

54 declared dependencies never landed in the tree. They are missing from Forge's resolution, not from the package.

+42 more not listed. The counts by reason above cover all of them.

Not followed: peerDependencies. This tree covers runtime dependencies only, so anything those pull in was never resolved.

Topics

Related in finance & trading