verdix-mcp

MCPcommunity
v0.3.0com.verdixapiMITUpdated 5d agonpmGitHub

Check an EVM address on Base before sending funds: safe/caution/danger. Pays per call via x402.

Works in
ClaudeCursorCopilotGemini

Inferred from the transports this listing declares (stdio). A client not listed here hasn’t been ruled out — it just isn’t something Forge can confirm.

Automatically indexed from public sources. Not yet verified by the developer on Forge.Claim this listing →
401Downloads/wk
5d agoLast update
Reads these credentials
  • VERDIX_PRIVATE_KEYAPI keyoptional

    Private key of YOUR Base wallet holding a little USDC. Used only locally to sign each x402 payment; never sent anywhere. Needed for the paid check tools, not for get_pricing.

Declared by the author in the official MCP registry. Forge does not store, broker, or ever see these values — the config below is scaffolded with placeholders you fill in locally.

Package
Authorcom.verdixapi
LicenseMIT
Version0.3.0
Sourcenpm+mcp-registry
npmverdix-mcp
GitHubverdixapi/verdix-mcp
SBOMCycloneDX 1.6 ↓
Trust Status
B
60/100Good
✓Listed in Forge index+10/10
—Publisher identity verified+0/20
→ Publisher: run `forge publish` from the package repo to claim ownership
—Ed25519 publish signature+0/5
→ Included automatically when the publisher runs `forge publish`
—Domain verification+0/5
→ Publisher: host /.well-known/forge.json on the package homepage with { "publisher": "<github-login>" }
—npm Trusted Publishing (Sigstore)+0/5
→ Publish from GitHub Actions with --provenance so the attestation binds this package to this repo
—npm maintainer match+0/5
→ Earned once your identity is verified above and that login is an npm maintainer of this package
✓CVE scan · clean+30/30
✓Static analysis · clean+20/20
Paste into Claude Code, Cursor, or any AI assistant to fix all gaps
StatusCommunity-indexed
PublisherUnverified
SignatureUnsigned
Domain—
Provenance—
Dependencies60 resolved · 1 with advisories
Tool surface2 tools · none privileged
Security scan⚠ Warnings (1)v0.3.0 · 4d agoHow well does this scan work?
HIGH@modelcontextprotocol/sdk@1.30.1MCP TypeScript SDK: OAuth client could send credentials to an authorization server chosen by the MCP server
EvalsNone
IndexedSep 27, 2026

Verification confirms publisher identity (repo ownership), not code safety. The security scan covers known CVEs and suspicious install scripts.

Tools

2 tools · none privileged
Statically extracted from the published packagev0.3.0 · 4d ago

Read out of the source npm actually ships, at scan time. The package was never executed. Tools registered dynamically at runtime, or hidden inside bundled or minified code, can be missed — so this is a floor on the tool surface, not a complete census of it.

check_address_riskScreen an EVM address on Base before sending it money or interacting with it. Returns Verdix's

Screen an EVM address on Base before sending it money or interacting with it. Returns Verdix's

No input schema was published for this tool.

get_pricingFree. Current Verdix price per tier (USDC on Base, via x402), the payment recipient, your

Free. Current Verdix price per tier (USDC on Base, via x402), the payment recipient, your

No input schema was published for this tool.

2 of 2 tools published a description.

Tool names and descriptions are written by the publisher and shown verbatim as inert text. They are the strings an MCP client passes to a model, so Forge scans them for prompt-injection patterns — any finding appears with the security scan above. “Privileged” is a keyword match on the tool name, not an audit of what the tool does: a benign-sounding name can still do anything.

About

Check an EVM address on Base before sending funds: safe/caution/danger. Pays per call via x402.

Keywords
mcp
Alternatives
Comparing tool surfaces…

Tools exposed

2 tools · none privileged · observed by static extraction. A tool surface is what one scan read on one day, not a live capability list.

Linked names open Forge’s index of every entry observed exposing that tool. Browse all indexed tools.

Dependency tree

What one Forge scan resolved from npm metadata on 2026-10-09 — observed resolution, not a publisher declaration.

60 packages resolved · 6 direct · 1 carrying advisories Resolution stops at depth 4 and 60 packages.

The crawl stopped at the 60-package limit. The rest of the tree was never resolved.

36 more resolved packages are not drawn here (display cap: 24). Every dependency carrying an advisory is drawn regardless of the cap. Full inventory (CycloneDX SBOM)

Declared but not resolved

58 declared dependencies never landed in the tree. They are missing from Forge's resolution, not from the package.

+46 more not listed. The counts by reason above cover all of them.

Not followed: peerDependencies. This tree covers runtime dependencies only, so anything those pull in was never resolved.